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ABSTRACT
NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS AND DYNAMICS:
RECIPROCITY, COMPETITION AND INFORMATION
DISSEMINATION
SEPTEMBER 2015
BO JIANG
B.Sc., TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY, BEIJING, CHINA
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Don Towsley
Networks are commonly used to study complex systems. This often requires a good
understanding of the structural characteristics and evolution dynamics of networks,
and also their impacts on a variety of dynamic processes taking place on top of them.
In this thesis, we study various aspects of network characteristics and dynamics, with
a focus on reciprocity, competition and information dissemination.
We rst formulate the maximum reciprocity problem and study its use in the in-
terpretation of reciprocity in real networks. We propose to interpret reciprocity based
on its comparison with the maximum possible reciprocity for a network exhibiting
the same degrees. We show that the maximum reciprocity problem is NP-hard, and
use an upper bound instead of the maximum. We nd that this bound is surprisingly
close to the empirical reciprocity in a wide range of real networks, and that there is
vi
a surprisingly strong linear relationship between the two. We also show that certain
small suboptimal motifs called 3-paths are the major cause for suboptimality in real
networks.
Secondly, we analyze competition dynamics under cumulative advantage, where
accumulated resource promotes gathering even more resource. We characterize the
tail distributions of duration and intensity for pairwise competition. We show that
duration always has a power-law tail irrespective of competitors' tness, while in-
tensity has either a power-law tail or an exponential tail depending on whether the
competitors are equally t. We observe a struggle-of-the-tness phenomenon, where
a slight dierent in tness results in an extremely heavy tail of duration distribution.
Lastly, we study the eciency of information dissemination in social networks with
limited budget of attention. We quantify the eciency of information dissemination
for both cooperative and selsh user behaviors in various network topologies. We
identify topologies where cooperation plays a critical role in ecient information
propagation. We propose an incentive mechanism called \plus-one" to coax users
into cooperation in such cases.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Most complex systems, be they technological or social, are naturally modeled as
networks, or, from a mathematical point of view, graphs, where nodes correspond to
discrete entities or components of a system and edges represent dyadic relations be-
tween components. Prominent examples are online social networks such as Facebook
and Google+, which make visible social ties between individuals. Another example
is furnished by the online encyclopedia, Wikipedia, which is a substantiation of the
structure of human knowledge. The emergence of these networks has triggered an
enormous amount of interest in the scientic community, and considerable work has
been devoted to their study.
One line of study focuses on the structural properties of networks themselves. Ex-
tensive empirical study has been conducted for a wide range of social and technologi-
cal networks, focusing on various network characteristics, such as degree distribution,
reciprocity and clustering coecient. Empirical study has led to many interesting dis-
coveries, such as the ubiquitous power-law degree distributions and the small world
property. On the theoretical side, a variety of models, either static or dynamic, have
been proposed to explain the empirical observations such as the power-law degree
distributions and the small world property.
Another line of study, in contrast, focuses on dynamic processes on networks. In
this case, networks often serve as platforms for the ongoing processes, which usually
involve information dissemination. The focus here is on understanding the interaction
of network structural characteristics and dynamic processes. For instance, network
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structures can aect, explicitly or implicitly, the eciency of information dissemina-
tion, which may in turn change the network structures, as exemplied by the constant
follow and unfollow actions on the Twitter network.
This thesis studies various aspects of networks along the two lines mentioned
above. The goal is to advance our understanding of structures and behaviors of large
scale complex networks.
In the rst part of the thesis, we focus on the interpretation of observed network
characteristics. The availability of vast amounts of large scale network data has made
it possible to study network characteristics and system behaviors as never before, so
we constantly face the problem of properly interpreting empirical observations. Dier-
ent network properties are commonly studied and interpreted separately. However,
they are generally interdependent. Specifying one usually imposes nontrivial con-
straints on another. Taking such constraints into account provides an additional, and
perhaps more appropriate, way of interpreting empirical observations. As a demon-
stration of the usefulness of this approach, we study the maximum reciprocity, i.e. the
maximum percentage of edges with a reciprocal edge, that is realizable by a network
with prescribed degree sequence.
In the second part of this thesis, we study network growth dynamics under cu-
mulative advantage, which refers to the \rich-get-richer" phenomenon. An example
of such growth dynamics is the Bianconi-Barabasi model [12]. The growth process
can be viewed as a competition for links, which, directly or indirectly, represent some
kind of resource. The evolution over time of the competition, and in particular the
change in leadership, is a very intricate process that depends on the interplay of the
cumulative advantage eect, individual competitiveness or tness, and randomness.
We focus on the relative leadership between two nodes and characterize the reduced
competition dynamics in terms of its duration and intensity.
2
In the third part of this thesis, we study information dissemination in social net-
works. The eciency of information dissemination as characterized by propagation
delay is aected by both network topology and user behavior. We analyze the e-
ciency for both cooperative and selsh user behaviors in various network topologies,
and explore the design of incentive mechanisms when cooperation is critical to ecient
information dissemination.
1.1 Thesis Contributions
This thesis makes the following main contributions.
 We formulate the maximum reciprocity problem that seeks the maximum reci-
procity realizable by a network with given degree constraints, and prove its
NP-hardness. We provide an upper bound together with necessary conditions
and sucient conditions for achieving the bound. We nd that this bound is
surprisingly close to the empirical reciprocity in a wide range of real networks,
and that there is a surprisingly strong linear relationship between the two. We
partially characterize networks with maximum reciprocity by identifying some
suboptimal motifs. We demonstrate that a particular type of small suboptimal
motifs called 3-paths are the major cause for suboptimality in real networks.
 We characterize the tail distributions of duration and intensity for pairwise com-
petition under cumulative advantage. When the two competitors are equally
competitive or t, we obtain the exact asymptotic distributions. When they are
not equally t, we obtain asymptotic bounds on the distributions. We demon-
strate that duration always has a power-law tail irrespective of competitors'
tness, while intensity has either a power-law tail or an exponential tail de-
pending on whether the competitors are equally t. We observe the struggle-of-
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the-tness phenomenon, where a slight dierent in tness results an extremely
heavy tail of duration distribution.
 We characterize for various network topologies the information propagation de-
lay for both cooperative and selsh user behaviors and the corresponding price
of stability. We identify topologies where cooperation plays a critical role in
ecient information propagation. We propose an incentive mechanism called
\plus-one" to coax users into cooperation in such cases, and demonstrate its
eectiveness through simulation.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents our investigation
on reciprocity in networks with degree constraints. Chapter 3 analyzes competition
dynamics under cumulative advantage. Chapter 4 explores the eciency of informa-
tion dissemination in social networks with limited budget of attention. We conclude
in Chapter 5 and discuss some future directions.
4
CHAPTER 2
RECIPROCITY IN NETWORKS WITH DEGREE
CONSTRAINTS
2.1 Introduction
Many complex networks are naturally directed, which endows them with nontrivial
structural properties not shared by undirected networks. One such property that
has been widely studied is reciprocity, which is classically dened as the fraction
of edges that are reciprocated, i.e. paired with an edge of the opposite direction.
Nontrivial patterns of reciprocity can reveal possible mechanisms of social, biological
or other nature that systematically act as organizing principles shaping the observed
network topology [31]. Previous work shows that reciprocity plays an important role
in many information networks such as email networks [57], the World Wide Web [3]
and Wikipedia [81, 82]. It is also shown that major online social networks that are
directed in nature, such as Twitter[44, 51], Google+[53], Flickr [56, 18], LiveJournal
[78, 56, 32], and YouTube [56], all exhibit a nontrivial amount of reciprocity.
When we try to interpret observed values of reciprocity, we are faced with the
problem of assessing the signicance of the observation. For instance, the Swedish
Wikipedia has reciprocity of 21%. How signicant is this? This question is often
answered by comparing measured values with the expected value of some null model.
One commonly used null model is a random graph with the same number of nodes
and edges [57]. An alternative is a random graph with specied degree sequence, as
the specic degree sequence is expected to aect reciprocity [79]. Networks are then
classied as reciprocal or anti-reciprocal according to whether the observed reciprocity
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is larger or smaller than the expected value [31]. Signicant deviation from the
expected values suggests the existence of some underlying organizational mechanism
at work. For our example of Swedish Wikipedia, the expected reciprocities in both
random null models are almost zero, so the Swedish Wikipedia is classied as a
reciprocal network. Informative as this might be, comparison with expected values
is not the whole story. Is 21% a signicant deviation from 0? Can we say that
the tendency to reciprocate is strong in this network? The answer might depend
on the eye of the beholder. However, if we know for some reason the maximum
possible reciprocity is only 28%, then we may safely conclude that 21% is indeed a
signicant amount of reciprocity. On the other hand, if the maximum is 90%, we
might conclude that 21% is not as signicant as suggested by the comparison with
random null models. In general, knowledge of the extremal values can give a better
idea about where the observation lies in the entire spectrum, which can potentially
change our conclusion about the signicance level of the observation.
Since real social networks often exhibit reciprocities larger than those associated
with the random null models, we concern ourselves only with the maximum achiev-
able reciprocity in this chapter. As in the random null models, we may want to retain
certain key structural features of the real network when we maximize reciprocity.
The particular feature that we choose to preserve here is the joint in- and out-degree
sequence, which is a confounding factor in the study of reciprocity [79]. In real net-
works, in- and out-degrees often serve as proxies for some kind of capacities of the
corresponding node. For example, in a le sharing network where edges represent
transfers from le sources to downloaders, the in-degree of a node can reect the
available network bandwidth and the out-degree the amount of resource. In a social
network where edges point from followers to followees, the in-degree of a node can
reect its fame and popularity and the out-degree its budget of attention. Quite often
these capacity constraints are too important to be ignored in the network under con-
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sideration. By preserving the degree sequence, we honor these capacity constraints,
thus controlling these confounding factors.
Motivated by the above considerations, we study the problem of maximizing reci-
procity subject to prescribed joint in- and out-degree constraints. We make the
following contributions in this chapter.
 We formulate the maximum reciprocity problem. We provide a simple upper
bound on reciprocity and prove that it is NP-complete to decide the achievability
of the bound. We also identify sucient conditions for achieving the bound.
 We demonstrate that the upper bound is surprisingly close to the empirical
reciprocity in a wide range of real networks, which suggests that the tendency
to form reciprocal edges might be much stronger than the observed reciprocity
indicates.
 We identify some suboptimal network motifs that can be eliminated to increase
reciprocity, thus providing a partial characterization of networks with maximum
reciprocity. Based on a particular type of small suboptimal motif called 3-
paths, we provide a greedy algorithm GreedyRewire to maximize reciprocity.
We demonstrate that 3-paths are the major cause for suboptimality in real
networks.
 We nd a surprisingly strong linear relationship between the empirical reci-
procity and the upper bound across a wide range of real networks. We also nd
a similar linear relationship between the number of reciprocated edges and the
corresponding upper bound on the logarithmic scale.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the max-
imum reciprocity problem. Section 2.3 proves the NP-hardness of the problem, and
provides a simple upper bound for the maximum reciprocity. Section 2.4 identi-
es patterns of maximum digraphs and provides a greedy algorithm for eliminating
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suboptimal motifs. Section 2.5 conducts some empirical study of real networks and
Section 2.6 concludes this chapter.
2.2 Graphic Sequences and Maximum Reciprocity Problem
In this section, we rst introduce the notion of a graphic sequence for undirected
graphs and then a graphic bi-sequence for directed graphs or digraphs for short, which
will be used in the theoretical analysis of Section 2.3. We then formulate the maximum
reciprocity problem. Throughout the rest of the chapter, a graph, directed or not,
always means a simple graph, i.e. no self-loops or multiple edges are allowed. We will
use the terms node and vertex interchangeably. For directed graphs, an edge always
means a directed edge.
2.2.1 Graphic Degree and Bi-degree Sequences
For an undirected graph G = (V;E), the degree dG(v) of a node v is the number of
edges incident to v. Associated with every graph G is a sequence d = fdG(v) : v 2 V g
of its degrees. However, not every sequence of nonnegative integers can be realized
by a graph. When it is realizable, the sequence is called graphic. More precisely, a
sequence of nonnegative integers d = (d1; d2; : : : ; dn) is called graphic if there exists
a graph G with nodes v1; v2; : : : ; vn such that dG(vi) = di for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. The
following classical theorem of Erd}os and Gallai [27] characterizes graphic sequences.
Theorem 2.2.1 (Erd}os-Gallai; Theorem 6.6 in [11]). A sequence of nonnegative
integers d1  d2      dn is graphic if and only if
Pn
i=1 di is even and
kX
i=1
di  k(k   1) +
nX
i=k+1
minfdi; kg; for k = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
The graphicality of a sequence can be tested in linear time using the Erd}os-Gallai
theorem [40]. It can also be tested using the constructive Havel-Hakimi algorithm in
O(n2 log n) time [37, 36].
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For a digraph G = (V;E), a node has both an in-degree and an out-degree. The
in-degree d G(v) of a node v is the number of directed edges coming into v, and the
out-degree d+G(v) is the number of directed edges going out of v. Associated with every
digraph G is a bi-sequence (d+;d ), where d+ = fd+G(v) : v 2 V g is the out-degree
sequence and d  = fd G(v) : v 2 V g is the in-degree sequence. As in the undirected
case, not every bi-sequence of nonnegative integers can be realized by a digraph. A
bi-sequence of nonnegative integers (d+;d ) = f(d+1 ; d+2 ; : : : ; d+n ); (d 1 ; d 2 ; : : : ; d n )g is
called graphic if there exists a digraph G with nodes v1, v2; : : : ; vn such that d
+
G(vi) =
d+i and d
 
G(vi) = d
 
i for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. The Fulkerson-Chen-Anstee theorem is the
analog of the Erd}os-Gallai theorem for graphic bi-sequences [30, 19, 5].
Theorem 2.2.2 (Fulkerson-Chen-Anstee). A bi-sequence f(d+1 ; : : : ; d+n ), (d 1 ; : : : ; d n )g
with d+1  d+2      d+n is graphic if and only if
Pn
i=1 d
+
i =
Pn
i=1 d
 
i and
kX
i=1
d+i 
kX
i=1
minfd i ; k   1g+
nX
i=k+1
minfd i ; kg; for k = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
The condition of the Fulkerson-Chen-Anstee theorem can be tested in O(n2) time.
The graphicality of bi-sequence can also be tested using the constructive Kleitman-
Wang algorithm in O(n2 log n) time [48].
2.2.2 Maximum Reciprocity Problem
In this subsection, we formulate the maximum reciprocity problem. For notational
simplicity, we henceforth make no distinction between a graph (digraph) and its edge
set when no confusion arises.
Given a digraph G, let Gs be the symmetric subgraph of G, i.e. (i; j) 2 Gs if and
only if both (i; j) 2 G and (j; i) 2 G. The reciprocated edges of a digraph G are
precisely those of Gs. Thus the number (G) of reciprocated edges in G is given by
(G) = jGsj, and the reciprocity of G is r(G) := (G)=jGj. Note that we use jGj to
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denote the number of edges in G and that each pair of reciprocal edges contributes
two to (G).
Given a graphic bi-sequence (d+;d ), let G(d+;d ) denote the nonempty set of
graphs that have (d+;d ) as their degree bi-sequence. Since the total number of edges
is xed for a given graphic bi-sequence, maximizing r(G) is the same as maximizing
(G). The maximum reciprocity problem is then to nd a digraph G in G(d+;d )
with maximum (G), i.e.
maximize (G)
subject to G 2 G(d+;d ):
We denote the maximum value by (d+;d ) and refer to a digraph G with (G) =
(d+;d ) as a maximum reciprocity digraph or maximum digraph for short.
2.2.3 Some Notations
We collect here some notations for later reference. Let G denote a generic digraph.
 Let Ga be the anti-symmetric subgraph of G, i.e. (i; j) 2 Ga if and only if
(i; j) 2 G but (j; i) =2 G. Note that G = Gs +Ga and Gs \Ga = ;, i.e. G is the
edge disjoint union of Gs and Ga.
 Let Gu be the undirected graph obtained by symmetrizing G, i.e. (i; j) 2 Gu if
either (i; j) 2 G or (j; i) 2 G.
Let (d+;d ) be a graphic bi-sequence.
 The min sequence is
d+ ^ d  = (d+1 ^ d 1 ; d+2 ^ d 2 ; : : : ; d+n ^ d n );
where a ^ b = minfa; bg.
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 The max sequence is
d+ _ d  = (d+1 _ d 1 ; d+2 _ d 2 ; : : : ; d+n _ d n );
where a _ b = maxfa; bg.
 The total number of edges is
"(d+;d ) =
X
i
d+i =
X
i
d i :
 The total balanced degree is
(d+;d ) =
X
i
d+i ^ d i ;
which is the `1-norm of the min sequence.
 The total unbalanced degree is
(d+;d ) =
1
2
X
i
jd+i   d i j;
which is the total variation distance between d+ and d . Note that "(d+;d ) =
(d+;d ) + (d+;d ).
2.3 Hardness Analysis and Bounds
In this section, we rst provide an upper bound for the maximum number of
reciprocated edges allowed by a graphic bi-sequence. We then prove that the maxi-
mum reciprocity problem is NP-hard by showing that it is NP-complete to decide the
achievability of the upper bound. Some sucient conditions for achieving the upper
bound are then provided.
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2.3.1 Upper Bound for Reciprocity
In this subsection, we rst establish a simple upper bound on the maximum num-
ber of reciprocal edges in terms of the total balanced degree of the graphic bi-sequence,
along with necessary conditions for achieving this upper bound. Some examples are
provided to illustrate how the necessary conditions may fail and that they are not
sucient, which provides insight into why the bound is not always tight.
Proposition 2.3.1. The number of reciprocated edges in any digraph with a given
degree bi-sequence cannot exceed the total balanced degree, i.e.
(d+;d )  (d+;d ):
A necessary condition for equality is that both d+ ^ d  and d+ _ d  be graphic.
Proof. Let G 2 G(d+;d ) be a maximum digraph. Note that the number of recip-
rocated edges going out of a node v is at most d+G(v) ^ d G(v). The desired bound is
obtained by summing over v.
If equality holds, then Gs, as an undirected graph, has degree sequence d
+ ^ d ,
and Gu has degree sequence d
+_d . Thus both d+^d  and d+_d  are graphic.
Note that it is possible that neither d+ ^ d  nor d+ _ d  is graphic. In fact, one
sequence can fail to be graphic independently of whether the other is graphic or not,
as illustrated by the following examples, where graphic bi-sequences are shown along
with the corresponding maximum digraphs.
Example 2.3.2. In Figure 2.1, neither the min sequence d+ ^ d  nor the max se-
quence d+ _ d  is graphic, since they both have odd sums. Here (d+;d ) = 2 <
(d+;d ) = 3.
Example 2.3.3. In Figure 2.2, the min sequence d+ ^ d  is graphic, while the max
sequence d+_d  is not. No reciprocity is allowed by this bi-sequence, i.e. (d+;d ) =
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1 2 3 4 5
i (d+i ; d
 
i ) d
+
i ^ d i d+i _ d i
1 (1; 0) 0 1
2 (1; 1) 1 1
3 (0; 2) 0 2
4 (2; 1) 1 2
5 (1; 1) 1 1
Figure 2.1: Graphic bi-sequence with non-graphic max and min sequences.
0, while the upper bound gives (d+;d ) = 2n, so the gap can be arbitrarily large.
The only unbalanced nodes s and r have very large unbalanced degrees that cannot be
absorbed by themselves, as a consequence of which some, in fact all, balanced degrees
have to be used for absorbing unbalanced degrees rather than forming reciprocal edges.
s
1
2
2n
r
i (d+i ; d
 
i ) d
+
i ^ d i d+i _ d i
s (2n; 0) 0 2n
1  2n (1; 1) 1 1
r (0; 2n) 0 2n
Figure 2.2: Graphic bi-sequence with graphic min sequence but non-graphic max
sequence.
Example 2.3.4. In Figure 2.3, the max sequence d+ _ d  is graphic, while the min
sequence d+ ^ d  is not. As in Example 2.3.3, no reciprocity is allowed here, i.e.
(d+;d ) = 0, while the upper bound is (d+;d ) = 2n. The situation is, however,
the opposite. Node 0 has too large a balanced degree relative to the number of nodes
with nonzero balanced degrees, which is one here. Thus some of the balanced degrees
have to be absorbed by the unbalanced degrees.
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0s1
s2
s2n
r1
r2
r2n
i (d+i ; d
 
i ) d
+
i ^ d i d+i _ d i
s1  s2n (1; 0) 0 1
r1  r2n (0; 1) 0 1
0 (2n; 2n) 2n 2n
Figure 2.3: Graphic bi-sequence with graphic max sequence but non-graphic min
sequence.
The common pattern in Examples 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 is that there are a small number
of nodes with extremely large degrees. In the social network context, these nodes
correspond to celebrities (node r in Figure 2.3.3), information aggregators (node s in
Figure 2.3.3), or middlemen (node 0 in Figure 2.3.4). These large degree nodes often
incur inevitable reduction of reciprocity from the upper bound.
The next example shows that the necessary condition in Proposition 2.3.1 is not
sucient.
Example 2.3.5. For the bi-sequence (d+i ; d
+
i ) = (n   i; i), i = 0; 1; : : : ; n, the upper
bound is (d+;d ) = bn=2c dn=2e. When n is a multiple of 4, both the max sequence
d+ _ d  and the min sequence d+ ^ d  are graphic. However, (d+;d ) = 0, as the
only digraph in G(d+;d ), of which (i; j) is an edge if and only if i < j, has zero
reciprocity; see Figure 2.4.
2.3.2 Proof of NP-hardness
We saw in the previous subsection that the upper bound may not be achievable.
Unfortunately, the next theorem shows that it is NP-complete to decide whether
the upper bound is achievable, which means the maximum reciprocity problem is
NP-hard.
Theorem 2.3.6. The decision problem whether (d+;d ) = (d+;d ) is NP-complete.
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0 1 2 n 1 n
i (d+i ; d
 
i ) d
+
i ^ d i d+i _ d i
0  bn=2c (n  i; i) i n  i
dn=2e  n (n  i; i) n  i i
Figure 2.4: Insuciency of necessary condition in Proposition 2.3.1.
Proof. Note that the problem is the same as the existence problem of a digraph
G 2 G(d+;d ) with (G) = (d+;d ). This problem is in NP, since given a digraph
G, we can verify whether (G) = (d+;d ) in polynomial time. To show that the
problem is NP-hard, we adapt the proof of Lemma 5 in [24] by reduction from the
3-color tomography problem, which is shown to be NP-hard therein.
Recall the 3-color tomography problem is as follows. Given nonnegative integral
vectors rw; rb 2 Nn, and sw; sb 2 Nm that satisfy
rwi + r
b
i  m; swj + sbj  n; for 1  i  n; 1  j  m;
and X
i
rci =
X
j
scj; for c 2 fw; bg;
decide if (rw; rb; sw; sb) is feasible, i.e. there exists a matrixM with entries in fw; b; gg
such that
rci = jfj :Mij = cgj; scj = jfMij = cgj; for c 2 fw; bg:
Let (rw; rb; sw; sb) be an n m instance of the 3-color tomography problem. For
1  i  n and 1  j  m, let
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d+i = r
w
i + r
b
i + n  1; d+n+j = swj ;
d i = r
w
i + n  1; d n+j = swj + sbj:
(2.1)
Now we show that the instance (rw; rb; sw; sb) is feasible if and only if (d+;d ) is
graphic and (d+;d ) = (d+;d ), where (d+;d ) = n(n  1) + 2Pni=1 rwi .
First assume that M is a solution to the 3-color tomography instance. We con-
struct a digraph G as follows. For 1  i  n and 1  j  m, let Wij = 1 if Mij = w,
and Bij = 1 if Mij = b. Let J be an n n matrix with all o-diagonal entries equal
to 1 and diagonal entries equal to 0. Let the adjacency matrix of G be
0B@ J W +B
W T 0
1CA :
It is straightforward to verify that G 2 G(d+;d ) and (G) = (d+;d ).
For the reverse direction, assume that (d+;d ) is graphic and (d+;d ) = (d+;d ).
Then there exists a digraph G 2 (d+;d ) with (G) = (d+;d ). Divide the adja-
cency matrix of G into the following block form
G =
0B@G11 G12
G21 G22
1CA :
where G11 is n n and G22 is mm.
Let  =
Pn
j=1 d
 
j  
Pm
i=1 d
+
n+i, which, by (2.1), evaluates to n(n   1). On the
other hand, d j =
Pn+m
k=1 G(k; j) and d
+
n+i =
Pn+m
k=1 G(n+ i; k), so
 =
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
G11(i; j) 
mX
i=1
mX
j=1
G22(i; j)  n(n  1) = ;
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where the inequality follows from the facts that G11(i; j)  1, G11(i; i) = 0 and
G22(i; j)  0. Since the equality holds, we must have G11 = J and G22 = 0. Thus
(G) = n(n  1) + 2
nX
i=1
mX
j=1
G12(i; j)G21(j; i)
 n(n  1) + 2
nX
i=1
mX
j=1
G21(j; i)
= n(n  1) + 2
mX
j=1
d+n+j = (d
+;d ) = (G):
Since the equality holds, G12(i; j)  G21(j; i). Thus G12 =W +B and G21 = W T for
some (0; 1)-matrices W and B. Let Mij = w if W (i; j) = 1, and Mij = b if Bij = 1.
Then M is a solution to the 3-color tomography instance.
Thus we have shown that it is NP-complete to decide whether (d+;d ) is graphic
and (d+;d ) = (d+;d ). Since the graphicality of (d+;d ) can be tested in
quadratic time using the Fulkerson-Chen-Anstee theorem, it must be NP-complete to
decide whether (d+;d ) = (d+;d ).
2.3.3 Sucient Conditions for Achieving Upper Bound
Given the hardness of the maximum reciprocity problem, we provide some su-
cient conditions for achieving the upper bound in Proposition 2.3.1. We start with the
following slightly more general theorem, which may be used to lower bound (d+;d ).
Theorem 2.3.7. (d+;d )  2m if there exists a sequence d0 such that
(1). d0 is graphic with
P
i d
0
i  m,
(2). the residual bi-sequence (d+   d0;d    d0) is also graphic,
(3).  <
q
n+
 
   1
2
2
+ 3
2
  , where n = jV0j,  =
W
i2V0(d
+
i + d
 
i   d0i ) and
 =
V
i2V0(d
+
i + d
 
i   d0i ), with V0 = fi : d+i _ d i > 0g.
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This theorem is analogous to Theorem 2.2 in [16], which deals with packing two
graphic sequences for undirected graphs. Theorem 2.3.7 deals with packing a graphic
sequence d0 for undirected graphs and a graphic bi-sequence (d+   d0;d    d0) for
digraphs. The proof is deferred to Appendix A.1.
Applying Theorem 2.3.7 with d0 = d+ ^ d , we obtain the following sucient
conditions for achieving the upper bound in Proposition 2.3.1.
Corollary 2.3.8. (d+;d ) = (d+;d ) if the following conditions hold,
(1). d+ ^ d  and (d+   d+ ^ d ;d    d+ ^ d ) are graphic;
(2).  <
q
n+
 
   1
2
2
+ 3
2
  , where n = jV0j,  =
W
i2V0(d
+
i _ d i ) and  =V
i2V0(d
+
i _ d i ), with V0 = fi : d+i _ d i > 0g.
Note that  is the maximum of either the in- or out-degrees. Putting an upper
bound on  rules out extremely large degrees, which are the trouble makers in the
examples of Section 2.3.1. However, in most real networks, we have  = 1, so the
sucient condition essentially requires  <
p
n, which, unfortunately, usually fails
to hold. In fact, it fails for most networks studied in Section 2.5.
2.4 Patterns in Maximum Digraphs
In this section, we identify some structural patterns of maximum digraphs, or
equivalently, the associated suboptimal structures that contribute to the loss in reci-
procity that is not imposed by the degree bi-sequence. We rst look at some small
suboptimal motifs and provide a greedy algorithm to eliminate them. We then show
some more complicated structural patterns of maximum digraphs and demonstrate
how they can help us pin down the maximum digraphs in some special cases.
Throughout this section, a cycle or a path always refers to a directed cycle or
directed path, i.e. the edges must be all in the same direction as we follow the cycle
or path. We also require that the edges be distinct. On the other hand, the vertices
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v0 v1
v2v3


(a) Type I.
v0 v1
v2v3
 
(b) Type II.
v0 v1
v2v3


(c) Type III.
v0 v1
v2v3
(d) Type IV.
Figure 2.5: Dierent types of 3-paths with corresponding rewirings. The edges marked
by red crosses are to be rewired into the dashed green edges.
are not necessarily distinct. When the vertices are distinct, we say the path or cycle
is elementary.
2.4.1 Small Suboptimal Motifs
In this subsection, we focus on a particular type of small motifs that we call 3-
paths, the nonexistence of which also guarantees the nonexistence of many larger scale
suboptimal structures. As we will see in Section 2.5, elimination of such suboptimal
motifs brings reciprocity close to the corresponding upper bound for a variety of real
world networks.
Given a digraph G, we call an elementary path of length 3,  = (v0; v1; v2; v3), a
3-path if (vi; vi+1) 2 Ga for i = 0; 1; 2, i.e.,  consists entirely of unreciprocated edges.
We further classify 3-paths into the following four types according to the connectivity
between v0 and v3,
(I). (v0; v3) =2 Gu, i.e. there is no edge between v0 and v3;
(II). (v0; v3) 2 Gs;
(III). (v3; v0) 2 Ga, i.e. (v0; v1; v2; v3; v0) is a 4-cycle;
(IV). (v0; v3) 2 Ga.
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As shown in Figure 2.5, 3-paths of Types I, II and III are suboptimal and can
be rewired locally to increase reciprocity. We say a digraph is 3-path optimal if it
has no 3-path of Type I, II or III. Note that when viewed as a transformation on
Ga, the rewiring procedure in Figure 2.5 simply eliminates 4-cycles (Type III), and
replaces open 3-paths by a shortcut from its rst vertex to its last vertex if such a
shortcut does not yet exist (Types I and II). Thus each rewiring increases the number
of reciprocated edges by either 2 or 4, and we have the following
Lemma 2.4.1. A maximum digraph is 3-path optimal.
Given a digraph G, we can greedily rewire all 3-paths to get a lower bound on the
maximum reciprocity allowed by the degree bi-sequence of G. The resulting greedy
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 GreedyRewire
Input: G = (V;E)
1: S  V
2: while S 6= ; do
3: pick v0 2 S
4: if there exists non-Type IV 3-path  = (v0; v1; v2; v3) then
5: G Rewire()
6: S  S [ fv1; v2g
7: else
8: S  S   fv0g
9: end if
10: end while
11: return G
Proposition 2.4.2 guarantees that Algorithm 1 eliminates all 3-paths of Types I,
II and III. The proof is deferred to Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2.4.2. Algorithm 1 returns a 3-path optimal digraph.
Note that depending on how v0 and  are picked, Algorithm 1 can return dierent
3-path optimal graphs. Although there is no theoretical guarantee, we will see in
Section 2.5 that reciprocities of 3-path optimal digraphs returned by Algorithm 1 are
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very close to the corresponding upper bounds and hence close to the maxima as well.
The next subsection shows that 3-path optimality precludes many other suboptimal
structures, which partially explains why Algorithm 1 works pretty well in practice.
2.4.2 Properties of Maximum Digraphs
In this subsection, we consider additional suboptimal structures that are more
complicated than 3-paths. Some of these structures are automatically eliminated
by Algorithm 1, while others require extra attention. We will state the results as
properties of maximum digraphs. Any violation of the stated properties yields a
suboptimal structure.
2.4.2.1 3-path Optimal Digraphs
We rst consider some properties of 3-path optimal digraphs, which, by Lemma 2.4.1,
are also properties of maximum digraphs. All these properties involve only unrecip-
rocated edges. Note that any suboptimal structures that violate these properties
are automatically eliminated by Algorithm 1. Let G denote a 3-path optimal digraph
throughout this subsection. Recall that in a 3-path optimal digraph, the only possible
3-path is of Type IV.
Lemma 2.4.3 shows that the unreciprocated edges of a 3-path optimal digraph
cannot form any elementary path of odd length without a shortcut. As a result, for
any two vertices u and v, either there is no path from u to v in Ga, or there is such
a path of length at most 2.
Lemma 2.4.3. If  = (v0; v1; : : : ; v2p+1) is an elementary path of odd length in Ga,
then (v0; v2p+1) 2 Ga.
Proof. We use induction on p. If p = 0, then (v0; v1) 2 Ga by assumption. If p = 1,
then  is a 3-path of Type IV and hence (v0; v3) 2 Ga. Now consider p  2. We have
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(v0; v2p 1) 2 Ga by the induction hypothesis. Then (v0; v2p 1; v2p; v2p+1) is a 3-path
of Type IV. Thus (v0; v2p+1) 2 Ga.
Lemma 2.4.4 shows that the anti-symmetric subgraph of a 3-path optimal digraph
is almost cycle free. We can obtain a directed acyclic graph from it by removing an
edge from each 3-cycle.
Lemma 2.4.4. The only possible cycles in Ga are 3-cycles, and any two distinct
3-cycles must be vertex disjoint.
Proof. We rst prove that two distinct 3-cycles must be vertex disjoint by contradic-
tion. Suppose they share at least one vertex v0. Let the cycles be C0 = (v0; v1; v2; v0)
and C1 = (v0; v3; v4; v0). Note that v1 6= v4 and v2 6= v3, as all edges are in Ga. Since
C0 and C1 are distinct, we must have either v1 6= v3 or v2 6= v4. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume v1 6= v3. Then (v1; v2; v0; v3) is a 3-path of Type IV, so (v1; v3) 2 Ga.
But then (v1; v3; v4; v0) is a 3-path of Type III, which is impossible. Therefore, C0
and C1 must be vertex disjoint.
Next we prove there are no elementary k-cycles for k  4. Suppose there is
such a cycle (v0; v1; : : : ; vk 1; v0). If k is even, (v1; vk 2) 2 Ga by Lemma 2.4.3.
But (v0; v1; vk 2; vk 1) is a 3-path of Type III, which is impossible. If k is odd,
then (v0; vk 2); (v1; vk 1) 2 Ga again by Lemma 2.4.3. But then (v0; v1; vk 1; v0) and
(v0; vk 2; vk 1; v0) are two distinct 3-cycles with two common vertices, which is again
impossible.
Finally, suppose there is a non-elementary cycle. We can be decompose it into
several distinct elementary cycles, all of which must be 3-cycles by the previous para-
graph. But then we have distinct 3-cycles that are not vertex disjoint, which is
impossible. Therefore, there are no k-cycles for k  4.
Although 3-path optimality does not preclude 3-cycles, they are unlikely to exist
in 3-path optimal graphs obtained from real world networks using Algorithm 1, as
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Lemma 2.4.5 requires that the vertices of a 3-cycle in such graphs have exactly the
same connectivity to every vertex outside the 3-cycle, which is extremely unlikely,
especially in large graphs.
Lemma 2.4.5. For a 3-cycle C in Ga and any vertex v not in C, if there is a path 
in Ga that connects v and C, then there is an edge of Ga between v and each vertex
of C, all in the same direction as  (i.e. from v to C or from C to v).
Proof. Let C = (v0; v1; v2; v0). Without loss of generality, assume  is from v to v0 and
has odd length. Successive application of Lemma 2.4.3 to the paths , (v; v0; v1; v2)
and then (v; v2; v0; v1), we obtain (v; v0) 2 Ga, (v; v2) 2 Ga and (v; v1) 2 Ga in the
same order.
2.4.2.2 Maximum Digraphs
In this subsection, we consider some properties of maximum digraphs that are
not direct consequences of 3-path optimality. The associated suboptimal structures
may be left intact by Algorithm 1 and require extra attention. Throughout this
subsection, let G? denote a maximum digraph with a given bi-sequence (d+;d ), i.e.
G? 2 G(d+;d ) and (G?) = (d+;d ).
We know from Lemma 2.4.4 that large cycles involving only unreciprocated edges
are suboptimal structures, but certain cycles of even length that contains reciprocated
edges are also suboptimal. In particular, we have the following
Lemma 2.4.6. Let C be an even cycle in H 2 G(d+;d ). If any two edges in C\Hs
are separated by an odd number of edges in C, then there exists H 0 2 G(d+;d ) with
(H 0) = (H) + jCaj   2jCa \ Hsj, where Ca is the anti-symmetric part of C, i.e.
Ca = f(i; j) 2 C : (j; i) =2 Cg.
Note that C \Ha  Ca but it is not necessarily true that Ca = C \Ha. The two
edges (3; 4) and (5; 0) in Figure 2.6(a) are in Ca but not in C\Ha. Any cycle satisfying
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Figure 2.6: Suboptimal even cycle with reciprocated edges. Reciprocity can be in-
creased by rewiring the edges marked by red crosses into the dashed green edges.
the conditions in Lemma 2.4.6 is suboptimal if it has more anti-symmetric edges than
symmetric ones. The cycles (0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 0) in Figure 2.6(a) and (0; 1; 2; 0; 5; 3; 4; 5; 0)
in Figure 2.6(b) are two such examples. Note that these two cycles are not automat-
ically eliminated by Algorithm 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.6. Let C = (v0; v1; : : : ; v2p 1; v2p = v0), where the vertices are
labeled such that (v2p 1; v0) 2 Hs if C \Hs 6= ;. Note that the vertices may not be
distinct. Note also that we must have (v2k; v2k+1) 2 Ha for all k. If (v2k; v2k+1) 2 Hs
for some k, then the number of edges in C between (v1; v2) and (v2k; v2k+1) would be
2k   2, contradicting the assumption that any two edges in C \Hs are separated by
an odd number of edges in C. As illustrated in Figure 2.6, let
H 0 = H   f(v2i 1; v2i)gpi=1 + f(v2i 1; v2i 2)gpi=1:
Since (v2i 2; v2i 1) 2 Ha, we have (v2i 1; v2i 2) =2 H and hence H 0 2 G(d+;d ). Note
that the edges in C \Ha are either absent from H 0 or in H 0s, so Ha H 0a = C \Ha =
Ca \Ha. On the other hand, all edges in C \Hs are removed from H 0, so H 0a Ha =
Ca \Hs. Thus by going from H to H 0, we eliminated jCa \Haj unreciprocated edges
while creating jCa \Hsj new ones. Therefore, (H 0) = (H)  jCa \Hsj+ jCa \Haj.
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Since jCaj = jCa \ Hsj + jCa \ Haj, the desired conclusion follows by eliminating
jCa \Haj.
Lemma 2.4.7 species how multiple 3-cycles should be connected in maximum
digraphs. If we collapse each 3-cycle into a single vertex by contracting its edges,
the subgraph of G?a induced by these vertices will have the structure in Figure 2.4.
Therefore, while the existence of multiple 3-cycles is already very unlikely in 3-path
optimal digraphs, it is even less likely in maximum digraphs with degree bi-sequences
of real world networks.
Lemma 2.4.7. The set of all distinct 3-cycles of G?a can be linearly ordered as
C0; C1; : : : ; Cm such that there are 9 edges of G
?
a going from Ci to Cj for all 0 
i < j  m.
Proof. Consider two distinct 3-cycles C = (v0; v1; v2; v0) and C
0 = (w0; w1; w2; w0).
There cannot exist a pair of edges from G?s that connect C and C
0; otherwise,
say (v0; w0) 2 G?s, the cycle (v0; v1; v2; v0; w0; w1; w2; w0; v0) would be suboptimal by
Lemma 2.4.6. On the other hand, there must be at least one edge between C and C 0;
otherwise, replacing Ci and Cj by the three pairs of edges f(vi; wi); (wi; vi)g2i=0 would
increase the reciprocity. Without loss of generality, assume (v0; w0) 2 G?a. It then fol-
lows from Lemma 2.4.5 that (vi; wj) 2 G?a for all i; j 2 f0; 1; 2g. By Lemma 2.4.4, such
edges cannot be part of any cycle. Therefore, we can sort the 3-cycles topologically
and label them in the desired way.
The next lemma complements Lemma 2.4.3 by specifying connection patterns of
elementary paths of even length.
Lemma 2.4.8. Let  = (v0; v1; : : : ; v2p) be an elementary path of even length 2p  4
in G?a, E0 = f(v2i; v2j) : i 6= jg and E1 = f(v2i 1; v2j 1) : i 6= jg. If (v0; v2p) =2 G?a,
then G? either has all the edges in E0 but none in E1, or vice versa.
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0 1 2 3 4
(a) E0  G?, E1 \G? = ;.
0 1 2 3 4
(b) E1  G?, E0 \G? = ;.
Figure 2.7: Patterns of even paths in maximum digraphs. Each undirected solid edge
represents a pair of reciprocated edges in G?. Each dashed edge represents a pair of
edges that are both missing in G?.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Figure 2.7 shows both possibilities for an elementary path of length 4. The short-
cuts required by Lemma 2.4.3 are also shown. The red dashed edges represent those
that cannot coexist with the green edges in a maximum digraph. Some suboptimal
structures that violate Lemma 2.4.8 cannot be automatically eliminated by Algo-
rithm 1. For example, if the pair of edges between the vertices 0 and 2 are missing
from Figure A.4, the resulting suboptimal digraph will be left intact by Algorithm 1.
2.4.3 Some Examples
In this subsection, we illustrate how the structural patterns of the previous sub-
section may be used to pin down the maximum digraph in some special cases. Here
G? always denotes a maximum digraph.
Proposition 2.4.9 shows that when the bi-sequence is perfectly balanced, the max-
imum digraph achieves perfect or near-perfect reciprocity. Therefore, any unfullled
reciprocity must be due to the lack of eort to form reciprocal edges rather than due
to the fundamental limit imposed by the bi-sequence itself.
Proposition 2.4.9. Suppose (d+;d ) is perfectly balanced, i.e. (d+;d ) = 0.
(1). If "(d+;d ) is even, then (d+;d ) = "(d+;d ).
(2). If "(d+;d ) is odd, then (d+;d ) = "(d+;d ) 3, and G?a consists of a 3-cycle.
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Proof. Since (d+;d ) = 0, we have d+i = d
 
i for all i. Thus any edge of G
?
a must be
contained in a cycle of length at least 3 in G?a. By Lemma 2.4.4, the length of such a
cycle is exactly 3. By Lemma 2.4.7, there is at most one such cycle in G?a. Thus G
?
a
is either empty or a 3-cycle. Since (G?) must be even, the former case corresponds
to even "(d+;d ) and the latter odd "(d+;d ).
The next proposition shows that when the bi-sequence is slightly unbalanced, the
number of possible values of (d+;d ) increases. This sheds some light on why the
maximum reciprocity problem is so dicult. As the total unbalanced degree increases,
the number of possibilities is expected to explode.
Proposition 2.4.10. Suppose (d+;d ) is slightly unbalanced with (d+;d ) = 1,
d+0   d 0 = 1 and d 1   d+1 = 1.
(1). If "(d+;d ) is even, then the gap "(d+;d )  (d+;d ) is either 2 or 4. When
the gap is 2, the two edges in G?a form a 2-path from 0 to 1. When the gap is
4, G?a is the vertex disjoint union of f(0; 1)g and a 3-cycle.
(2). If "(d+;d ) is odd, then the gap "(d+;d )  (d+;d ) is either 1 or 5. When
the gap is 1, G?a = f(0; 1)g. When the gap is 5, G?a is the vertex disjoint union
of a 2-path from 0 to 1 and a 3-cycle.
Proof. Note that there must be a path from 0 to 1 in G?a. Let  be the shortest path
from 0 to 1 in G?a. All edges in G
?
a , if there is any, must be contained in a cycle in
G?a. By Lemma 2.4.4, G
?
a can only have 3-cycles. If G
?
a had more than one 3-cycles,
Lemma 2.4.7 would require that there be at least 9 edges in G?a that are not contained
in any cycle, all of which must be in . Lemma 2.4.3 shows that  has either one or
two edges. Therefore, G?a    is either empty or has one 3-cycle. By Lemma 2.4.5,
 and the 3-cycle, if there is one, must be vertex disjoint. Since jj 2 f1; 2g, and
jG?a j 2 f0; 3g, it follows that "(d+;d ) (G?) = jG?aj = jj+ jG?a j  2+3 = 5.
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(a) G.
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(b)  and G?a   .
Figure 2.8: Example 2.4.11.
Note that (G?) is even. If "(d+;d ) is even, then "(d+;d ) (G?) is equal to jj = 2
or (G?) = jj+ jGa  j = 1+ 3 = 4. If "(d+;d ) is odd, then "(d+;d )  (G?) is
equal to jj = 1 or jj+ jG?a   j = 2 + 3 = 5.
It is easy to come up with examples where the gaps are 1 and 2, respectively. The
next examples shows that the other two cases are also possible.
Example 2.4.11. Let (d+;d ) = f(1; 3; 2; 2; 2); (0; 4; 2; 2; 2)g. Figure 2.8(a) shows
a realization G of this bi-sequence, where each undirected edge represents a pair of
edges in opposite directions. Note that (G) = "(d+;d )  4. We claim that (G) =
(d+;d ). If not, then (G?) = "(d+;d ) 2 by Proposition 2.4.10, and the two edges
in G?a form a 2-path  from a to b. Since c, d, e have the same in- and out-degrees
and hence are equivalent, we may assume without loss of generality that  = (a; c; b).
Thus G?a    is symmetric and corresponds to a simple graph with degree sequence
d^ = f0; 3; 1; 2; 2g. There is only one simple graph with this degree sequence, which is
shown by the black edges in Figure 2.8(b). When we superimpose  and G?a , there
are two edges from (c; b), and hence G? =2 G(d+;d ), a contradiction.
Example 2.4.12. Let (d+;d ) = f(1; 0; 4; 2; 2; 2); (0; 1; 4; 2; 2; 2)g. Figure 2.9 shows
a realization G of this bi-sequence, where each undirected edge represents a pair of
edges in opposite directions. Note that (G) = "(d+;d )   5. Since the sequence
d+ ^ d  = f0; 0; 4; 2; 2; 2g is not graphic, Proposition 2.3.1 shows that (d+;d ) <
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"(d+;d )   1. Thus Proposition 2.4.10 yields (G) = (d+;d ). In fact, G is the
only element of G(d+;d ).
a
b
c d
e
f
Figure 2.9: Example 2.4.12.
2.5 Empirical Study
In this section, we conduct an empirical analysis of real networks by comparing
the observed values of reciprocity against the upper bounds. We also look at the
lower bounds on maximum reciprocities given by Algorithm 1.
2.5.1 Datasets
The networks that we analyze include major online social networks (OSN) that
are directed in nature [56, 51, 35, 77, 52]. For the purpose of comparison, we have
also included other types of networks: biological networks [73, 74, 68, 76, 70, 80],
communication networks [52], product co-purchasing networks [52], web graphs [52],
Wikipedias [1], software call graphs [75, 66], and P2P networks [52]. All the datasets
except for Wikipedias are already converted into graph representations by other re-
searchers and the descriptions for the datasets can be found at the cited sources. For
Wikipedias, each node represents a page. Only article pages, i.e. pages with names-
pace ID 0, are included. Pages that redirect to the same page are represented as a
single node corresponding to the destination page. There is an edge from node A
to node B if there is at least one hyperlink from page A to page B. Multiple edges
and self-loops are discarded. Some basic statistics of the networks can be found in
Appendix B.
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Figure 2.10: Scatter plot of empirical reciprocity versus upper bound. Regression line
was tted without data points for biological, P2P and software call networks.
2.5.2 Empirical Reciprocity vs. Upper Bound
Figure 2.10 shows the scatter plot of empirical reciprocities against the correspond-
ing upper bounds. Here the upper bound is normalized by the number of edges, i.e.,
it is the ratio (d+;d )="(d+;d ). Note that the reciprocity values vary widely,
ranging from 0 for the peer-to-peer network Gnutella to 90% for the online social
network Slashdot. There is even a fair amount of variation within the categories of
biological, social and Wikipedia networks. In general, social networks and Wikipedia
networks tend to have high reciprocity, while software call networks tend to have
low reciprocity. Note the strong linear correlation between empirical reciprocity and
the upper bound. This is a little bit surprising, especially for the social networks,
in view of the large variations in reciprocity. Related to Figure 2.10 is the scatter
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Figure 2.11: Scatter plot of number of reciprocated edges versus upper bound. Re-
gression line was tted in log scale, without data points for software call networks.
plot in Figure 2.11 of number of reciprocated edges against the unnormalized bound
(d+;d ). There the linear relationship in log-log scale is even more apparent, with
biological networks being also around the regression line. These linear relationships
suggest that there might exist some universal mechanism that works across dierent
domains.
Despite the wide variation in reciprocity, the ratio between the empirical reci-
procity and the normalized upper bound has a much narrower range as shown by the
box plots for the ratios in Figure 2.12.
Note that the ratios are close to zero for the P2P network Gnutella and software
call graphs. The Gnutella exhibits zero reciprocity, far away from the upper bounds
that are above 30%. This is probably because Gnutella implements an indirect reci-
procity mechanism. The low reciprocity for software call graphs is not surprising, as
software codes are usually designed to work in a hierarchical manner. The case for
biological networks are more complicated, as the four biological networks considered
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Figure 2.12: Box plot of reciprocity-bound ratio for dierent network categories.
here are actually of quite dierent natures. For example, the C. Elegan neural net-
work and the mouse cortex network are both neural networks, but the former is at the
neuron level while the latter is at a coarser level of cortical regions. One can speculate
that both the low reciprocity in C. Elegan neural network and the high reciprocity in
the mouse cortex network are due to biological reasons. However, we do not know if
this behavior is a norm or an exception due to the lack of data for similar networks.
In all categories other than biological, software call and P2P networks, the ratios
are above 50% with only three exceptions: the wiki-Vote network, the Stack Overow
Q&A network, and the Spanish Wikipedia. Although we have classied the Stack
Overow Q&A network as a social network, it diers from typical social networks.
The low reciprocity suggests that there is a hierarchy of expertise. What is more
interesting is the wiki-Vote network and the Spanish Wikipedia, as their behaviors
deviate from those of other networks of the same category, which suggests that there
might be something unusual about them that is worthy of scientic study. Apart from
the three outliers, all other networks in these categories actually achieve a signicant
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fraction of the possible reciprocity suggested by the upper bound. This means that
modulo the degree constraints, the tendency to reciprocate is much stronger than the
empirical reciprocity alone might have suggested. Prominent examples include the
web graphs, the Swedish Wikipedia and the Google+ network, whose reciprocities are
not very high in absolute value but quite high relative to the bound. This suggests
that when we study these networks, it might be more meaningful to ask the question
why there is such large imbalance in degrees than to ask the question why the tendency
to reciprocate is low.
2.5.3 Reciprocity of 3-path Optimal Digraphs
In this subsection, we look at 3-path optimal digraphs returned by Algorithm 1.
Note that the reciprocity of such a digraph provides a lower bound on the maximum
reciprocity of the corresponding degree bi-sequence.
Figure 2.13 shows the scatter plot of the reciprocities of the 3-path optimal di-
graphs against the corresponding upper bounds. Figure 2.14 shows the box plots of
their ratios. Note that the reciprocities of 3-path optimal digraphs are close to the
upper bounds, especially for communication, co-purchasing, social and Wikipedia
networks. This means that the maximum reciprocities are also close to the upper
bounds. Therefore, for the degree bi-sequences of those real networks, the fundamen-
tal limit that they impose on reciprocity is largely summarized by the upper bounds,
and the major source of loss in reciprocity is the existence of 3-paths of Types I, II
and III. Thus in practice Algorithm 1 usually suces for approximating maximum re-
ciprocities and we do not need to worry much about the more complicated suboptimal
structures in Section 2.4.2.2.
Finally, recall from Section 2.4.2.1 that the existence of 3-cycles in a 3-path optimal
digraph requires some specic structures. These structures are usually too special to
occur in practice, so 3-cycles are unlikely to exist in 3-path optimal digraphs. This
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Figure 2.13: Scatter plot of reciprocity of the 3-path optimal digraph returned by
Algorithm 1 versus upper bound.
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is indeed the case for most of the 3-path optimal digraphs obtained from the real
networks studied here, the anti-symmetric parts of which turn out to be acyclic.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we showed that the maximum reciprocity problem is NP-hard.
We provided a partial characterization of networks with maximum reciprocity and a
greedy algorithm to eliminate suboptimal motifs. We also provided an upper bound
on reciprocity along with necessary conditions and sucient conditions for achiev-
ing the bound. We demonstrated that the bound is surprisingly close to the observed
reciprocity in a wide range of real networks, which suggests that the tendency to form
reciprocal edges might be much stronger than the observed reciprocity indicates. We
found surprising linear relationships between empirical reciprocities and the corre-
sponding upper bounds. We showed that a particular type of suboptimal motif called
3-paths is the major source of loss in reciprocity in these networks.
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CHAPTER 3
COMPETITION UNDER CUMULATIVE ADVANTAGE
3.1 Introduction
Growth is a fundamental aspect inherent to most networks that has been widely
investigated both empirically through the analysis of data from various contexts and
theoretically through idealized models. An important driving force behind network
growth and in particular the evolution of node degrees is cumulative advantage (CA),
where accumulated edges (i.e., current node degree) promote gathering even more
edges; see [62] and the reference therein. A second widely-accepted driving force in
this context is tness, which captures the inherent ability of nodes to attract edges.
Thus, dynamics of network growth is governed by skill (tness) and luck (random
but biased edge attachment).
Recent work has framed the problem of network growth as a competition among
nodes [50, 72, 63]. In essence, nodes in a network compete with one another to
accumulate edges, increasing (or descreasing) their degrees over time. As expected,
such competitions are also driven by skill and luck and have been studied empirically
and theoretically for dierent networks, an example of which is the evolution and
predictability of success in citation networks [72]. Outside the domain of networks,
the study of skill and luck competitions has a long history in social and physical
sciences [7, 22].
However, the intricacies of skill and luck competitions are far from trivial, even
in a simple CA model with just two competitors. To illustrate, consider a network
with two hub nodes that compete for connectivity. Each time a new node joins the
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network, it connects to one of the hubs randomly with bias depending on the hubs'
tnesses (model details given in Section 3.3). In the presence of CA, the bias also
depends on the hubs' current degrees. Figure 3.1(a) and Figure 3.1(b) illustrate the
dierence of the hubs' degrees over time for two sample paths in the absence and
presence of CA, respectively. The paths with the same color and label in both plots
are generated using the same pseudorandom sequence. The competition is tied every
time the degree dierence is zero and we dene the competition duration as the
time until the nal tie occurs. Note that the red path in Figure 3.1(b) lasts much
shorter than the red path in Figure 3.1(a), while the blue path in Figure 3.1(b) lasts
signicantly longer than the blue path in Figure 3.1(a). This suggests a potentially
larger variance in competition duration in the presence of CA. Moreover, with CA
the less t hub may enjoy a sizable degree leadership for a long time; see the blue
path in Figure 3.1(b). These observations also apply to two specic nodes in more
general network growth models, provided that we interpret \time" as the increase in
the total degrees of the two given nodes. However, are these sample paths anomalies
or the norm? Can we be more precise about these observations?
In this chapter, we aim to develop a fundamental understanding of the eects of
CA in such growth competitions. We approach this problem by considering classical,
simple and well-studied theoretical models for competitions based on skill and luck
that are either coupled with or free of cumulative advantage. These models may not
be general enough as statistical models that t real-world data for competitions in
growing networks, as such models must capture intricate features of the domain, such
as skill distribution or amplitude of cumulative advantage (e.g., linear or sub-linear),
as well as their time dependency. However, they still provide invaluable insights into
how CA impacts competitions. More specically, we focus on competitions between
two agents (nodes) and study two fundamental aspects of competitions: duration
{ the time required for the most skilled to overtake its competitor and forever en-
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Figure 3.1: Time evolution of degree dierence between two nodes in competitions
without and with cumulative advantage (CA). Each plot shows two independently
simulated sample paths. The sample paths with the same color in both plots use the
same sequence of pseudorandom numbers. Competition starts tied and node X is
10% tter than node Y . See model details in Section 3.3.
joy undisputed leadership; intensity { the number of times competitors tie for the
leadership. In this direction, we make the following main contributions.
 In the case where the two competitors have equal tness, we obtain the asymp-
totic tail distributions for both duration and intensity of CA competitions. We
demonstrate that they are power laws with respective tail exponents  1=2 and
 1, which are independent of the initial wealth of the competitors.
 In the case where the two competitors have unequal tness, we derive asymptotic
lower and upper bounds for the tail distribution of duration of CA competitions,
and an upper bound for the tail distribution of their intensity. These bounds
show that duration is heavy tailed while intensity is exponential tailed in the
presence of CA. In particular, duration is heavier tailed while intensity is lighter
tailed than corresponding RW competitions.
 We observe that a slight dierence in tness of the two results in a extremely
heavy tail for duration of CA competitions. Thus, an individual that is only
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slightly more skilled than his competitor might have to hang on to the compe-
tition for an extremely long period of time before taking the ultimate lead, a
phenomenon we call the \struggle of the ttest".
Despite 90 years since the basic CA model was rst proposed [25], known as
Polya's urn model, the work in this chapter is, to the best of our knowledge, the
rst to characterize the duration and intensity distributions of CA competitions with
skill. We believe our ndings have profound implications to our understanding of
competitions, beyond its importance to the evolution of degree of nodes in growing
networks.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briey discusses the
related work. Section 3.3 introduces the CA competition model. Section 3.4 presents
the theoretical results, illustrated and supplemented by simulations. Section 3.5 con-
cludes this chapter.
3.2 Related Work
Resource accumulation is an ubiquitous phenomenon that naturally arises in a
variety of social and complex systems. The problem is usually framed as a competition
among agents for resources that are abundant, and has been studied in dierent
contexts across various disciplines ranging from protein binding within a cell [26, 46]
to views of online social media [14, 29] and citations among scholarly papers [65, 72].
In the context of networks, network growth and in particular node degree evolution
has been recently framed as competition among nodes, where dierent aspects of
competitions have been studied empirically and theoretically [72, 63, 33, 50, 13].
Models for resource accumulation competitions generally incorporate skill (t-
ness), luck (randomness) and externalities. Cumulative advantage is one type of
externality that is considered a general mechanism for inequality [22]. It appears in
the literature under many variants such as Price's cumulative advantage model [65],
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preferential attachment [9, 10, 12], \the rich get richer", Matthew eect [22, 55, 62],
and path-dependent increasing returns [7]. The Polya's urn model [25, 54] is widely
used to capture these eects. Most previous work on Polya's urn model and its gen-
eralizations focuses on the share of resources gathered by each agent, also known
as the agent's market share, proving convergence and limiting results of the market
share distribution [54, 43, 61]. More recent studies consider Polya's urn models with
non-linear bias [23], the eects of initial conditions of urns [59, 15], as well as the time
for the rst tie [6] and probability of a tie ever occuring [71].
However, two fundamental metrics associated with competitions, duration - how
long it takes for the undisputed winner to emerge, and intensity - how many times
the competitors tie for the leadership, have largely been neglected in the literature.
Previous results establish that the most skilled agent eventually wins [54], and that
average intensity up to time t is approximately (log t), where  depends on the
relative skill of the competitors [34, 33]. To the best of our knowledge, no previous
work has provided rigorous characterizations for the distributions of duration and
intensity of competitions in Polya's urn models. This chapter partially lls this gap for
the two competitor case and sheds light on some recent approximate results [34, 33].
3.3 Models
In this section, we formally introduce competition models for two competing
agents and give precise denitions for two fundamental metrics of a competition,
i.e. its duration and intensity.
3.3.1 General Setup and Metrics
Let X and Y denote the two agents that engage in the competition. Each agent
is associated with a positive tness value that reects its intrinsic competitiveness or
skill level. Let fX and fY denote the tness of X and Y , respectively, and r = fX=fY
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Xt
Yt
Figure 3.2: State space of competition processes, with an illustration of a sample
path with x0 = 2, y0 = 1, and three ties at time t = 3; 5; 7.
the tness ratio. Without loss of generality, we assume that fX  fY and hence
r  1.
The resource that the agents compete for will be generically referred to as wealth,
which is measured in discrete units. The competition starts at time t = 0 with
agents X and Y having x0 and y0 units of initial wealth, respectively. We consider a
discrete-time process. At each time step, one unit of wealth is added to the system
and given to either X or Y . Denote by Xt and Yt the respective cumulative wealth
of X and Y at time t. The complete history of the competition f(Xt; Yt)g1t=0 then
forms a discrete-time discrete-space stochastic process. The state space S is the rst
quadrant of the integral lattice (see Figure 3.2),
S = f(x; y) 2 Z2 : x  1; y  1g:
The initial condition is (X0; Y0) = (x0; y0). How the process evolves over time is
determined by specic competition models, of which the CA competition model to
be introduced in Section 3.3.2 is an example.
We now make the notions of duration and intensity of competitions more pre-
cise by dening them through events of wealth ties. Given a competition process
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f(Xt; Yt)g1t=0, we say that a tie occurs at time t if Xt = Yt. Figure 3.2 shows three
ties at times t = 3; 5; 7.
The duration T of a competition is dened to be the time of the last tie, i.e.,
T = supft  0 : Xt = Ytg:
When there is no tie, we follow the standard convention that T = sup ; =  1. The
competition ends at time T in the sense that one of the agents takes the lead and
never lose it again after T .
The intensity Nt of a competition until time t is the number of ties that occur by
time t, i.e.,
Nt =
tX
i=0
1Xi=Yi ;
where 1A is the indicator of event A. The intensity N of a competition is the total
number of ties throughout the competition, i.e., N = limt!1Nt. This measures
the intensity of the competition in the sense that it counts the number of potential
changes in leadership. Note that T < +1 if and only if N < +1.
3.3.2 CA Competition Model
In the CA competition model, the unit of wealth introduced at time t+1 is given
to X with probability
pX;t =
fXXt
fXXt + fY Yt
=
rXt
rXt + Yt
;
otherwise it is given to Y . Note that the transition probability pX;t embodies both
tness and CA eects (externalities).
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More formally, in the CA competition model, the complete history f(Xt; Yt)g1t=0
forms a discrete-time Markov chain with stationary transition probabilities. The
transition probability P[(Xt+1; Yt+1) = (x0; y0) j (Xt; Yt) = (x; y)] is given by
QCA;r(x; y;x
0; y0) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
rx
rx+ y
; if (x0; y0) = (x+ 1; y),
y
rx+ y
; if (x0; y0) = (x; y + 1),
0; otherwise.
(3.1)
Note that the transition probabilities are spatially inhomogeneous, i.e., they depend
on the current state (x; y), which makes the analysis dicult, especially when r > 1.
For the purpose of comparison, a RW competition model incorporates skill and
luck but not the CA eect (no externalities), where the transition probabilities are
determined entirely by the tness ratio r. In particular, the probability that agent X
receives the unit of wealth introduced at any time is always given by
pX =
fX
fX + fY
=
r
r + 1
:
Thus the RW competition model is a discrete-time Markov chain with the same state
space S as the CA competition model, but with the following spatially homogeneous
transition probabilities,
QRW;r(x; y;x
0; y0) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
r
r + 1
; if (x0; y0) = (x+ 1; y),
1
r + 1
; if (x0; y0) = (x; y + 1),
0; otherwise.
The spatial homogeneity of the transition probabilities leads to a more tractable
analysis. In fact, the dierence process fXt   Ytg is a standard biased RW with
parameter r=(r + 1). Thus the abundance of known results for RW [38] can be
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directly translated into results for RW competitions, including duration and intensity
as we have dened in Section 3.3.1.
Throughout the rest of this chapter, we use CA= and RW= to denote CA and
RW competitions with identical tness (r = 1), respectively. We use CA 6= and RW 6=
to denote CA and RW competitions with distinct tnesses (r > 1), respectively.
Before presenting our results, we point out some connections between the CA and
RW models that are useful in our analysis. In particular, in CA=, all paths connecting
two given states (x0; y0) and (x; y) have the same probability. This is a nice property
that CA= shares with RW, which enables us to leverage existing results on RW in
our analysis of CA=. Unfortunately, this property is lost in CA 6=, where we resort to
the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation for upper and lower bounds on the probabilities
of interest. In the limiting case where Xt and Yt are both large but comparable to
each other, the connection to RW is again partially retained, a fact we also exploit in
the analysis of CA 6=.
3.4 Results
In this section we present our theoretical results for duration and intensity distri-
butions, which are also illustrated graphically and supported by extensive numerical
simulations. Table 3.1 provides a summary of our main results along with prior
knowledge about RW competitions from the literature. Note that P(x0;y0)hModeli;r denotes
the probability in model hModeli 2 fCA;RWg with tness ratio r and initial state
(x0; y0). The following notations have been used in Table 3.1 and will be used through-
out the rest of this chapter.
 f(x)  g(x) if and only if limx!1 f(x)=g(x) = 1.
 f(x) . g(x) if and only if lim supx!1 f(x)=g(x)  1.
 f(x) & g(x) if and only if lim infx!1 f(x)=g(x)  1.
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metric hModeli r = 1 r > 1
duration T :
P(x0;y0)hModeli;r[T  t]
CA  t 1=2 . t
 (r 1)x0
& t (r 1)(x0  1r )
RW 1 
h
4r
(r+1)2
it
intensity N :
P(x0;y0)hModeli;r[N  n]
CA  n 1    2
r+1
n 1
RW 1
 
2
r+1
n 1
Table 3.1: Tail distributions for duration and intensity of competitions in both RW
and CA models. Multiplicative constants are omitted in all expressions involving t
and n. The RW statistics can be found in most textbooks on the topic, e.g. [38, pp.
113,116].
All proofs are relegated to Appendix C.
3.4.1 Competition Duration
As shown in Table 3.1, RW= competitions never end, i.e., P(x0;y0)RW;1 [T = 1] = 1,
while RW6= competitions are generally very short, whose durations exhibit exponen-
tial tails. The story for CA competitions is drastically dierent. The introduction
of CA guarantees that a competition always ends, i.e. P(x0;y0)CA;r [T < 1] = 1, even
when the two agents are equally t, which is in sharp contrast to endless RW= com-
petitions. On the other hand, CA fundamentally increases the chance of having a
long-lasting competition between unequally t agents, as the duration of CA 6= always
has a power-law distribution, in contrast to a sub-exponential distribution for RW6=.
Thus, cumulative advantage does not always make competitions shorter as one might
expect.
3.4.1.1 Equal Fitness Case: CA=
The following theorem shows that the duration T for CA= is heavy-tailed with an
asymptotic power-law distribution.
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Theorem 3.4.1. The duration of a CA= competition has the following asymptotic
tail distribution,
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T  t] 
1
2x0+y0 5=2
p
B(x0; y0)
t 1=2; (3.2)
where B(x; y) =
R 1
0
sx 1(1  s)y 1ds is the beta function.
It follows from (3.2) that
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T <1] = 1  limt!1P
(x0;y0)
CA;1 [T  t] = 1;
i.e. the duration of CA= is almost surely nite.
Note, however, that the power-law exponent is always  1=2, independent of the
initial wealth x0 and y0. Consequently, although the duration of CA= is nite rather
than innite as in RW=, the expected duration is still innite, even if x0 is signicantly
larger than y0 or vice versa.
On the other hand, the initial wealth (x0; y0) does aect the multiplicative factor in
(3.2). Figure 3.3 shows the duration distributions from simulations for various values
of initial wealth, with the asymptotes in Eq. (3.2) superimposed. Each simulation
curve is the average of 105 independent runs for 107 time steps each. All curves are
truncated at t = 106, since the empirical distributions will drop down sharply and
become inaccurate as t approaches the cuto time in simulations. Similar truncations
will be applied to later plots without further mention. Note the good agreement
between theory and simulation in the tails in Figure 3.3. When both x0 and y0
increase but are kept equal, the distribution curve shifts upwards, which means the
competition lasts longer. When the initial wealth of only one agent (y0 here) increases,
the distribution curve shifts downwards, which means the competition is shorter.
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Figure 3.3: Tail distribution for duration of CA= with various (x0; y0). The dots are
simulation results. The solid lines are the asymptotes in Eq. (3.2).
3.4.1.2 Dierent Fitness Case: CA 6=
The next theorem shows that the tail distribution of the duration T for CA 6= is
asymptotically bounded by power laws from both above and below.
Theorem 3.4.2. The tail distribution of the duration of a CA 6= competition has the
following asymptotic bounds,
'1 t
 (r 1)x0 . P(x0;y0)CA;r [T  t] . '2 t (r 1)(x0 1=r); (3.3)
where
'1 =
 (rx0 + y0)
(r + 1)x02x0+y0 1 (x0) (y0)
; (3.4)
and
'2 =
2(r 1)(x0 r
 1) (r 1) (rx0 + y0)
(r + 1)(x0   r 1) (x0) (y0) ; (3.5)
where  (x) =
R1
0
sx 1e sds is the gamma function.
It follows from the lower bound that P(x0;y0)CA;r [T < 1] = 1 for r > 1, i.e. the
duration for CA 6= is almost surely nite as is for CA=. The constants '1 and '2 are
very loose, so the bounds are best interpreted as bounds on the tail exponent.
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Figure 3.4: Tail distribution for duration of CA6= with r = 1:2 and various (x0; y0).
The dots are simulation results. The solid lines are the asymptotic lower bound in
Eq. (3.3) but shifted closer to the simulation results for easier visual comparison of
the slopes.
Note that the power-law exponents in the upper and lower bounds depend on
x0 but not on y0, and they dier only by 1   1=r < 1. In this sense, the shape of
the distribution at large t is largely determined by the tness ratio and the initial
wealth of the tter agent, while the initial wealth of the less t plays a much weaker
role. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4, which shows the duration distributions from
simulations for r = 1:2 and various values of (x0; y0), alongside the lower bounds from
Eq. (3.3) that are shifted closer to the simulation results for easier comparison of the
slopes. Each simulation curve is the average of 105 independent runs for 109 time
steps each.
Figure 3.4(a) shows how the slopes of the distribution curves, which correspond
to the power-law exponents, depend critically on x0. The impact of x0 is two-fold. As
x0 increases, the distribution curve becomes more tilted as predicted by the bounds.
At the same time, it also shifts downwards. Both changes mean that the competition
tends to be shorter.
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Figure 3.4(b) shows the impact of changing both x0 and y0. When x0 is xed,
increasing y0 only results in a slight decrease in the absolute value of the slope, in
agreement with Eq. (3.3). The distribution curve shifts upwards, which means the
competition tends to last longer. When both x0 and y0 increase, the situation becomes
more intricate. The curve may shift upwards while bending down faster in the tail,
which could possibly lead to a crossover in the old and new curves, as is the case of
going from (x0; y0) = (1; 1) to (x0; y0) = (3; 3). In this case, the new competition is
more likely to have a medium duration.
3.4.1.3 Struggle-of-the-Fittest Phenomenon
Now we look at the impact of tness ratio r on duration. Contrasting Eqs. (3.2)
and (3.3) leads to an interesting observation. Departing from CA= by slightly increas-
ing the tness ratio r from 1 to 1 + ", where " is close to 0, precipitates a signicant
increase in the probability of long-lasting competitions, as manifested in the discon-
tinuous jump in the power-law exponents from  1=2 in Eq. (3.2) to  "x0  0 in
Eq. (3.3). This is opposite to what happens in RW competitions, where a slight in-
crease in tness departing from RW= to RW6= transforms the competition from one
that never ends to one with a geometrically distributed duration. The lower bound
in Eq. (3.3) shows that CA 6= with r < 1 + (2x0) 1 is more likely to have long-lasting
competitions than CA=, despite the fact that the tter agent is bound to become the
ultimate winner. We refer to the phenomenon that the tter agent takes an extremely
long time to win as \struggle of the ttest".
Figure 3.5 shows the duration of simulated CA competitions for various tness
ratios r. Each simulation curve is the average of 105 independent runs for 109 time
steps each. Note how the distribution of duration jumps upward from the curve for
CA= to the curve for CA6= with r = 1:1. It also shows how the curves for CA 6=
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Figure 3.5: Tail distribution for duration of CA with various r. The dots are simu-
lation results. For r = 1, the solid line is the asymptote in Eq. (3.2). For r > 1, the
solid lines are the lower bound in Eq. (3.3) but shifted as in Figure 3.4.
become more and more tilted as r increases, being roughly parallel to the CA= curve
at r = 1 + (2x0)
 1 = 1:5.
3.4.2 Competition Intensity
Given that CA competitions are long-lasting, one might expect them also to be
intense, i.e., exhibit many ties (Xt = Yt). As we will see in this section, this intuition
is appropriate for CA= but not for CA 6=.
3.4.2.1 Equal Fitness Case: CA=
The following theorem shows that the intensity N of CA= is heavy-tailed with an
asymptotic power-law distribution.
Theorem 3.4.3. The intensity of a CA= competition has the following asymptotic
tail distribution,
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [N  n] 
1
2x0+y0 2B(x0; y0)
n 1; (3.6)
where B(x0; y0) is the beta function as in Eq. (3.2).
In this case, the intensity has innite expectation, as does the duration. Figure 3.6
shows the duration distributions from simulations for various values of initial wealth,
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Figure 3.6: Tail distribution for intensity of CA= with various (x0; y0). The dots are
simulation results. The solid lines are the asymptotes from Eq. (3.6).
with the asymptotes in Eq. (3.6) superimposed. Each simulation curve is the average
of 105 independent runs for 107 time steps each. We observe the same behavior as
in Figure 3.3. When both x0 and y0 increase but are kept equal, the distribution
curve shifts upwards, which means the competition is more intense. When the initial
wealth of only one agent (y0 here) increases, the distribution curve shifts downwards,
which means the competition is less intense.
We mention in passing that if we have a nite observation time tf , the expected
intensity Ntf by time tf grows as log tf , a phenomenon observed for the related CA
model in Godreche et al. [33].
3.4.2.2 Dierent Fitness Case: CA 6=
In sharp contrast, CA 6= competitions are not intense despite their long durations.
In fact their intensities are surprisingly mild, bounded above by a geometric distri-
bution, as shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.4.4. The tail distribution of the intensity of a CA 6= competition has the
following upper bound,
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Figure 3.7: Tail distribution for intensity of CA with various r. The dots are simula-
tion results. The solid lines are the upper bounds from Eq. (3.7) for r > 1, and the
asymptote in Eq. (3.6) for r = 1.
P(x0;y0)CA;r [N  n]  C

2
1 + r
n 1
; (3.7)
with
C =
8>><>>:
1; x0  y0;
(y0)x0 y0
(rx0+y0)x0 y0
 
1 + 1
r
x0 y0 ; x0 > y0;
where (x)k =
Qk 1
i=0 (x+ i) is the Pochhammer symbol.
Note that the expectation and all higher moments of N are nite. Therefore,
the intensity of a CA competition changes dramatically when the tnesses of the
two parties become unequal, the distribution shifting from a power-law tail to an
exponential tail. This is illustrated in Figure 3.7, where each simulation curve is the
average of 105 independent runs for 109 time steps each. An important observation
is that both CA 6= and RW6= competitions have intensities that are upper bounded by
identical exponential tails (see Table 3.1), while exhibiting fundamentally dierent
durations.
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Why are CA6= competitions simultaneously not intense and long-lasting? The an-
swer resides in the probability of Y being the eventual winner. In CA= competitions,
Y wins with probability y0=(x0+y0), while in CA 6= competitions Y (the less t) never
wins. However, for small values of r, especially for those very close to one, the dy-
namics in the initial stages of the competition closely follows that of CA=. Thus there
is a non-negligible chance that Y takes a signicant lead, with the CA eect helping
it uphold the lead for a long period of time over which there is no tie. Eventually,
however, the tness eect outweighs the CA eect, and X catches up with Y . By
then they both have large accumulated wealth, which makes CA6= behave like RW6=
in the vicinity of X = Y , allowing X to quickly establish a lead ahead of Y . At
this nal stage both tness and CA eects work in favor of X, and Y stands little
chance in taking the lead again. To summarize, the less t agent has a non-negligible
probability of taking an early lead which can last for a very long time due to the
CA eect, but it will ultimately surrender the lead to the tter agent and never lead
again, a phenomenon that we call \delusion of the weakest", which is the ip-side of
\struggle of the ttest".
Figure 3.8 illustrates this observation by showing sample paths for dierent values
of r, all generated using the same sequence of random numbers. Note that for r = 1
(identical tness), Y wins quickly, whereas for r = 1:1 the tter agent X, having
trailed behind for a long time, eventually takes over after 69,426 time steps. Finally,
for both r = 1:2 and r = 1:5 agent X has no trouble quickly winning the competi-
tion. These sample paths showcase the long struggle of the \slightly" tter agent in
competitions with CA eects.
3.4.3 Interplay of Duration and Intensity
In this section, we study the relationship between duration and intensity. Note
that duration gives a natural upper bound N  T=2 for intensity, i.e., the number
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Figure 3.8: \Delusion of the weakest": sample paths for dierent values of r (x0 =
y0 = 1), all generated using the same sequence of random bits.
of ties is at most half of the duration in any competition. In CA=, duration and
intensity are strongly and positively correlated. In fact, a tie at time t increases the
probability of having another tie at a time greater than t. More precisely, [6] shows
that for CA=,
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T > tjXt = Yt] ' 1 
1p
Xt
: (3.8)
Since Xt  t=2 at a tie, Eq. (3.8) implies that the later a tie occurs, the more likely
another tie will occur, intuitively explaining why long-lasting competitions are also
intense in this case.
Figure 3.9 shows a scatter-plot of duration versus intensity from 104 independent
runs of CA= competitions with x0 = y0 = 1, each simulated for 10
9 time steps. This
unveils a strong positive linear correlation between the two statistics in log-log scale
(sample Pearson correlation coecient of 0.94).
Interestingly, CA 6= shows a dierent behavior, since even long-lasting competi-
tions exhibit only a small number of ties. Figure 3.10 shows simulation results for
conditional average intensities of competitions with x0 = y0 = 1 and dierent tness
ratios r, conditioned on the duration being at least t. Each simulation curve is ob-
tained from 104 independent runs for 109 time steps each. Note that for r = 1, the
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Figure 3.9: Scatter plot of duration vs. intensity for CA=.
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Figure 3.10: Conditional average intensity of competitions conditioned on their du-
ration being at least t, namely E(x0;y0)CA;r [N j T  t].
conditional average intensity increases linearly with t, but for r > 1, it stabilizes as t
increases. Again, we observe a sharp transition as we move from identical to distinct
tnesses, this time in the correlation between intensity and duration.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
As various empirical studies [67, 72, 69, 22, 63, 62] suggest that real world com-
petitions for resource accumulation are subject to cumulative advantage eects, at
least to some extent, a theoretical understanding of the role of skill and luck in com-
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petition dynamics becomes a pressing issue. Recent theoretical studies [21, 6, 50, 33]
have contributed in this direction.
However, contrary to prior theoretical works, we considered simple and classical
mathematical models that capture just the essence of skill and luck competitions with
and without CA eects, and investigated fundamental aspects of competition, namely
duration (i.e., time until ultimate winner emerges) and intensity (i.e., number of ties
in competition). By considering simple models and simple properties we proved and
illustrated fundamental theoretical results: CA eect exacerbates the role of luck {
power-law tail duration emerges regardless of skill dierences, and become extreme
(i.e., innite mean) when skill dierences are small enough. Moreover, duration is
long not necessarily because of intense competition where agents tussle aggressively
for ultimate leadership. On the contrary, under CA, competitions are generally very
mild, exhibiting an exponential tail. Long competitions emerge when an early stroke
of luck places the less skilled in the lead, who can then, boosted by CA eects, enjoy
leadership for a very long period of time. Thus, when CA is present luck sides with
the less skilled.
The non-negligible probability of long-lasting competitions has far-reaching impli-
cations. In the absence of CA, it takes very little time for the ttest agent to establish
dominance, so it is often reasonable to neglect the possibility of a premature burnout.
Such observations are in hand with the \survival of the ttest" principle, since soon
enough the more skilled will prevail. In the presence of CA, however, even agents
with superior tness may face the challenge of having to endure extremely long com-
petitions. This challenge becomes all more real when the tness superiority is only
minimal. Will the more skilled survive the seemingly eternal inferiority during the
competition? Under CA time becomes a central issue, with delusion becoming re-
ality if the more skilled burns out during a long struggle. Thus, in the face of CA,
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the ttest survives only if it can persist, which prompts us to rename the principle
\survival of the ttest and persistent" when considering CA competitions.
This observation may also shed light on the seemingly inherent diculty of pre-
dicting success in real-world competitions by observing ongoing sample paths. Dif-
ferent empirical studies have alluded to this problem [67, 72, 69] as well as recent
model driven studies [21]. Since direct competitions tend to be relatively very short
and skill-dierences tend to be small it is well very possible that the winner when
competition ended was not the ttest, adding to the diculty of making accurate
predictions.
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION IN SOCIAL
NETWORKS UNDER LIMITED BUDGET OF
ATTENTION
4.1 Introduction
Information dissemination has been transformed by the emergence of online social
networks and their enthusiastic adoption by users. Users rely on trust relationships
in social networks for accessing information. Relationships form on the basis of the
quality of information received, and in turn determine the speed of propagation in
the network.
The literature on information propagation in social networks, or rumor spread-
ing [64] is wide and varied; we mention here only those that are most relevant to
the work in this chapter. Previous work has mostly studied the propagation of a
rumor originating at a given source. The typical model is the randomized broadcast
model [47] which is carried out in synchronized rounds. In each round, each user
selects a neighbor at random and propagates a rumor. The spreading mechanisms
considered have been broadly of three types: push mechanisms where the user sends
the rumor if he has it, to the chosen neighbor; pull mechanisms where the user pulls
the rumor from the chosen neighbor; and a combined mechanism, where the user
pushes the rumor if he has it and pulls it if the chosen neighbor has it. Most previous
work focus on the characterization of the delay in spreading a single rumor to all nodes
(e.g. [20], [17]). An asynchronous model is considered by Amini et al. [4], where each
node contacts a neighbor after a random amount of time; they focus in particular on
random regular graphs and derive performance results in terms of optimal delay.
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What has been overlooked in most previous work is the practical constraint that
each user has a limited budget of attention, that is, a limited frequency with which
he interacts with his neighbors. Each user then has to allocate his limited budget
of attention among his neighbors. There is some work on analyzing the allocation
patterns using real world data. In particular, Backstrom et al. [8] analyze a data
set of real measurements on how users split their attention among their friends on
Facebook. They consider activities such as communication and viewing and show how
the balance of attention varies across activities and other personal characteristics.
Since the level of attention aects information ow [49], the allocation of the budgets
of attention will have an impact on information propagation.
This chapter considers a scenario of information propagation where there are mul-
tiple information sources in the network and each user has a limited budget of at-
tention. Each user allocates his budget strategically with the objective of timely
reception of news. We consider an asynchronous pull model, where each node con-
tacts a neighbor after a random delay and pulls any content available at that neighbor
and the frequency with which he pulls content from neighbors is limited. Our ob-
jective is to identify optimal allocations of this limited frequency among neighbors
for each user in the network and to inform the design of algorithms for optimal in-
formation spread. In particular, we want to answer the question \when users make
selsh decisions on how to allocate their limited access frequency among neighbors,
does information propagate eciently?" We take the approach of conceiving a gen-
eral model for studying the balance of attention, and an analysis for several network
topologies.
We investigate the eciency of selsh allocation by considering the metric of
average end-to-end delay of content spread. We make the following contributions:
 We study the eciency of selsh allocation of the budget of attention by char-
acterizing the price of stability (PoS) for several network topologies.
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 We identify topologies with inecient propagation under selsh allocations.
 We propose the \plus-one" mechanism, an incentive scheme that coaxes users
into mimicking a gradient-descent algorithm, bringing the cost of content prop-
agation closer to the optimal.
 We present numerical results that compare the optimal, selsh, and feedback-
based allocations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We dene the social network
model in Section 4.2, and present the analysis of optimal and distributed allocation
over several topologies in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we present our feedback-based
mechanism. Numerical results follow in Section 4.5 and we conclude in Section 4.6.
4.2 Model Description
We consider a social network where each user has a set of friends, or contacts, that
he links to, or follows, in order to get content such as news updates, videos, or other
messages. Each user then makes all content that he holds available to his followers,
such as on the Facebook wall or Twitter stream. Rather than a single source of
content, we allow all users to create content, at a given rate. Further, we assume
that users seek to obtain all content circulating in the network. Users consult their
contacts for the latest updates of information with the objective of minimizing the
average delay for obtaining all information. As in real online social networks, users
have a limited budget of attention, that is, the total rate at which they may consult
their contacts is limited. As such, this rate must be allocated among the contacts
in a manner that optimizes for delay. We will compare a centralized optimization
of consultation rates with a distributed one where users optimize the allocation in a
selsh manner.
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We model the social network as a directed graph G = (V;E), where V is the set
of users, and E is the set of directed edges between users, i.e. (i; j) 2 E if and only
if there is an edge from i to j. Denote by N(i) the set of in-neighbors of user i, i.e.
N(i) = fj 2 V : (j; i) 2 Eg, and let di = jN(i)j be the in-degree of i. We assume
that G is strongly connected.
Each user i 2 V creates contents according to a Poisson process with rate i > 0.
When the i's are the same, we denote the common value by . User i consults his
in-neighbor j 2 N(i) according to a Poisson process with rate xji. Each user has a
limited budget of attention bi > 0, so that the rates of consultation are constrained
by
P
j2N(i) xji = bi. When the bi's are the same, we denote the common value by b.
In terms of the normalized rates yji = xji=bi, the budget constraint becomes
X
j2N(i)
yji = 1: (4.1)
The vector yi = fyji : j 2 N(i)g represents how user i allocates his budget of attention
among his neighbors, which will be referred to as his strategy. The set of all possible
strategies of user i is the unit simplex i in Rdi . Let y = fyi : i 2 V g be the strategy
prole of the network, and  =i2V i is the set of all possible proles. Also let
y i be the strategy prole of all users other than i.
For any i 6= j, dene Dji(y) to be the delay for user i to receive content originated
at user j under prole y. Dene the cost for user i to be
Ci(y) =
1
 i
X
j2V nfig
jEDji(y); (4.2)
where  i =
P
j2V nfig j, and dene the social cost to be
C(y) =
1
(n  1)
X
i2V
X
j2V nfig
jEDji(y); (4.3)
61
where  =
P
i2V i. Note that both (4.2) and (4.3) are independent of any normal-
ization of the i's, which just translates a change of units. We set  = 1 when content
creation rates are homogeneous.
Let C = miny2C(y) be the optimal social cost, and y a prole that minimizes
the social cost C. Let     be the set of proles that are Nash equilibria when
each user minimizes his own cost in a selsh manner. In general there might exist
multiple equilibria. A standard measure of ineciency of equilibria is the price of
anarchy (PoA). It is dened as the ratio of the cost at the worst equilibrium to that
of an optimal outcome, i.e., maxy2 C(y)=C. We are, however, interested in the best
equilibria, which would give us a benchmark of what's achievable through distributed
means. As such, we focus on the price of stability (PoS), dened as the ratio of the
cost at the best equilibrium to that of an optimal outcome [58], i.e.,
PoS = min
y2 
C(y)
C
=
bC
C
; (4.4)
where bC = miny2 C(y)  C is the minimum social cost under a selsh allocation.
Even though the PoS can be seen as a weaker notion of ineciency, we nd it more
interesting in a practical sense, since it gives us a target performance for the design of
distributed algorithms. In some cases, e.g., in a tree network, the Nash equilibrium
is unique, so the PoS coincides with the PoA.
In what follows, we will measure ineciencies in the selsh allocation of the budget
of attention in several network topologies. We will show that some topologies lead
to large ineciencies. In Section 4.4 we propose a feedback-based mechanism that
results in a distributed allocation that has a cost closer to the optimal cost than does
the selsh allocation.
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4.3 Eciency Analysis
We will now study the eciency of selsh optimization on several social network
topologies. The interest in studying various topologies lies not only in understanding
how existing social networks with those topologies perform, but also in identifying
ecient structures for information dissemination. The latter may inform smart design
for information propagation.
4.3.1 Tree Network
We rst consider tree topologies. Such structures are interesting as networks
since information dissemination can be locally tree-like. Let G be a tree; for all tree
networks we study, we will assume G is undirected. Let Tji denote the component
containing j when an edge (j; i) 2 E is removed. Let ji =
P
k2Tji k be the aggregate
content creation rate of the nodes in Tji, and nji = jTjij the number of nodes in Tji.
For i 6= j, let Pj i be the unique shortest path from j to i. The average delay for
user i to get contents originated in j is then EDji(y) =
P
e2Pj i x
 1
e , where xe = xuw
for an edge e = (u;w). Thus the cost for user i is
Ci(y) =
1
 i
X
j:j 6=i
j
X
e2Pj i
1
xe
=
1
 ibi
X
k2N(i)
ki
yki
+ f(y i);
where f(y i) represents terms that do not depend on yi. Note that f(y i) can be
innity for some y i on the boundary of  i. However, since users are trying to
collect all the information, even selsh users have incentives to keep y in the interior
of  so that no information pathway is eectively cut o. Therefore, we will assume
y is in the interior of , and consequently f(y i) is nite.
If user i selshly minimizes Ci, the unique best rate allocation, irrespective of how
others allocate their budgets of attention, is given by
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byji = pjiP
k2N(i)
p
ki
; for j 2 N(i): (4.5)
Note that in this case each user has a unique best selsh strategy independent of
others' strategies. Thus there is a unique Nash equilibrium and the PoS coincides
with the PoA.
The social cost can be written as follows,
C =
1
(n  1)
X
i2V
X
j:i6=j
j
X
e2Pj i
1
xe
=
1
(n  1)
X
(u;w)2E
1
xuw
X
i2V
X
j:i6=j
j1(u;w)2Pj i
=
1
(n  1)
X
(u;w)2E
1
xuw
X
i2Twu
X
j2Tuw
j
=
1
(n  1)
X
(u;w)2E
nwuuw
yuwbw
=
1
(n  1)
X
i2V
1
bi
X
k2N(i)
nikki
yki
:
Thus the social cost under selsh allocation (4.5) is given by
bC = 1
(n  1)
X
i2V
1
bi
0@ X
j2N(i)
nij
p
ji
1A0@ X
j2N(i)
p
ji
1A : (4.6)
However, the socially optimal rate allocation is given by
yji =
p
nijjiP
k2N(i)
p
nikki
; for j 2 N(i); (4.7)
with the optimal social cost being
C =
1
(n  1)
X
i2V
1
bi
0@ X
j2N(i)
p
nijji
1A2 : (4.8)
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We will now study in more detail specic tree structures: the line, the k-ary tree,
and the chained star networks.
4.3.1.1 Line Network
Suppose G is a line network, with V = f1; :::; ng and (i; i + 1) 2 E for i =
1; 2; : : : ; n  1 and (i; i  1) 2 E for i = 2; : : : ; n. Theorem 4.3.1 below gives bounds
on the range of C and bC and an upper bound on the PoS. Note that the upper
bound on PoS does not depend on the content creation rates i. When the budgets
of attention are homogeneous, we have PoS  5, but C = (n=b).
Theorem 4.3.1. In a line network of n  2 nodes, the optimal social cost and the
cost under selsh allocation are bounded as follows,
n+ 1
8bmax
 C  bC  n+ 1
bmin

9
8
+
1
4n  4

; (4.9)
and
PoS  5bmax
bmin
; (4.10)
where bmax = maxi bi and bmin = mini bi.
Proof. See Appendix D.1.
When the budgets of attention are heterogeneous, the upper bound in (4.10) can
become arbitrarily large. In this case, the PoS can be arbitrarily large as well, as
shown in Theorem 4.3.2.
Theorem 4.3.2. The PoS can be arbitrarily large when the budgets of attention are
heterogeneous in a line network.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
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4.3.1.2 Chained Star Network
Consider k star networks, each with p nodes. The hubs of the stars are chained
to form a line network, with a total of n = pk nodes. Such topologies are not
uncommon in social networks based on communities. Such structure might correspond
to communities focused on given topics or interests, that are then connected to the
larger social network. Theorem 4.3.3 shows that while the optimal social cost can be
large, the PoS is of order 1 in the homogeneous case.
Theorem 4.3.3. In a chained star network with n users, homogeneous content cre-
ation rates  = 1 and homogeneous budgets of attention b, the optimal social cost and
cost under selsh allocation satisfy
C = 
 
b 1maxfp; kg = 
(b 1pn);
bC =   b 1maxfp; kg ;
with PoS = (1).
Proof. See Appendix D.3.
Remark. Suppose b = 1. As p changes from (1) to (n), C can have any order
between (
p
n) and (n). In particular, C = (n) for p = 1 and p = n, which
correspond to the line and star networks, respectively.
4.3.1.3 k-ary Tree Network
We now consider rooted trees where each node has k children. Such structures
are of interest for social networks with few edges, as sparse random graphs are locally
tree-like. Theorem 4.3.4 below states the PoS for k-ary trees. Corollary 4.3.5 shows
that this PoS can be arbitrarily large for k of constant order and as k scales sublinearly
with n, even if the content creation rates and budgets of attention are homogeneous.
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Theorem 4.3.4. In a k-ary complete tree with n users, homogeneous content creation
rates  = 1 and homogeneous budgets of attention b, the optimal social cost and the
cost under selsh allocation satisfy
C = 
 
b 1k logk n

;
bC =   b 1k logk n+ b 1pn ;
with
PoS =
bC
C
= 

1 +
p
n log k
k log n

:
Proof. See Appendix D.4.
Corollary 4.3.5. Let b = 1 and k = (n).
(1). If  = 0, i.e. k = (1), the costs are C = (log n), bC = (pn), and
PoS = (
p
n= log n).
(2). If 0 <  < 1=2, the costs are C = (n), bC = (pn), and PoS =   n1=2 .
(3). If   1=2, the costs are C = (n), bC = (n), and PoS = (1).
The above corollary veries the intuition that long thin networks are less ecient
for information propagation than wide networks. The former type of network thus
would require an incentive-based mechanism to make them more ecient. We will
propose one such mechanism in Section 4.4.
4.3.2 Clique Networks
We now consider the case where G is a clique. This is, in some sense, the best-
case scenario, where users have the widest choice possible in allocating their budget
of attention. The analysis is more involved since there are many paths between each
source-destination pair, creating a more complicated dependency structure between
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the various links. We consider eciency for the homogeneous case, where i = 1 and
bi = b. We will show that there exists a selsh prole that is asymptotically optimal,
and thus the price of stability is bounded and approaches one as the network size
increases.
Let us consider the uniform strategy for user i 2 V , where the consultation rate
is yji = uji = b=di for all j 2 N(i). Let ui = fuji : j 2 N(i)g and u i = fuj : j 2
V n figg. The prole u = fui : i 2 V g is referred to as the uniform prole. For a
clique network, uji = b=(n  1) for all i 6= j.
Theorem 4.3.6. For an n-clique with homogenous content creation rates  = 1 and
budgets of attention b, the social cost Cu of the uniform prole is Cu = b 1Hn 1,
where Hn =
Pn
k=1 k
 1, the n-th harmonic number.
Proof. We follow the approach in [41]. LetDj(m) be the delay for a content originating
from j to reach at least m other users, i.e. Dj(m) is the m-th order statistic of
fDji : i 2 V n fjgg for a given j. Let Vjk = Dj(k)  Dj(k 1), with the convention that
Dj(0) = 0. Thus
X
i:i 6=j
Dji =
n 1X
m=1
Dj(m) =
n 1X
m=1
mX
k=1
Vjk =
n 1X
k=1
(n  k)Vjk: (4.11)
Note that Vjk is exponentially distributed with parameter
b
n 1k(n   k). Taking ex-
pectations of (4.11) we get:
X
i:i6=j
EDji =
n 1X
k=1
(n  k)EVjk =
n 1X
k=1
n  1
bk
=
n  1
b
Hn 1:
Summing over j and dividing by n(n 1), we obtain the social cost Cu = b 1Hn 1.
The next theorem shows that the uniform stratety by a given user is the best
response when all other nodes follow the uniform strategy, showing that this is a
Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 4.3.7. For an n-clique with homogenous content creation rates 1 and bud-
gets of attention b, the uniform prole is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose users i = 1; 2; : : : ; n 1 follow the uniform strategy and consider user
n. For a given j,
Djn(yn;u n) = min
1kn 1

1
ykn
Xkn + Y
n
jk

;
where fXkngn 1k=1 are i.i.d. exponential random variable with parameter b, and Y njk
is the time for an item originating from j to reach k without passing through n.
Note that fXkngn 1k=1 are independent of fY njkgnk=1. Let Tnj = fT njign 1i=1 be the or-
der statistics of Ynj = fY njkgn 1k=1 . By symmetry, the random vectors (Y nj1; : : : ; Y nj;n 1)
and (T nj(1); : : : ; T
n
j(n 1)) are identically distributed, where  is a permutation chosen
uniformly randomly from the symmetric group Sn 1, independently of Tnj . Therefore,
P[Djn(yn;u n) > x j Tnj ]
= P
"
n 1\
k=1
fXkn > ykn(x  T nj(k))g
Tnj
#
= E
"
exp
(
 b
n 1X
k=1
ykn(x  Tj(k))+
)#
 exp
(
 b
n 1X
k=1
yknE(x  Tj(k))+
)
= exp
(
 b
n 1X
k=1
ykn
n 1X
l=1
1
n  1(x  Tjl)
+
)
= exp
(
 b
n 1X
l=1
1
n  1(x  Tjl)
+
)
= P

Djn(un;u n) > x j Tnj

;
where the inequality follows from Jensen's inequality. Therefore, for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n 1,
P [Djn(yn;u n) > x]  P [Djn(un;u n) > x] :
69
Integrating over x from 0 to1, we obtain EDjn(yn;u n)  EDjn(un;u n) and hence
Cn(yn;u n)  Cn(un;u n) for any yn 2 n. Therefore, the uniform prole is a Nash
equilibrium.
The next theorem shows that the cost of the uniform prole is larger than the
optimal social cost by at most 1=b. Thus the price of stability approaches one as the
network size increases.
Theorem 4.3.8. In any network of size n where every user publishes at rate  = 1
and has a budget of attention b, the optimal social cost for any user i is lower bounded
by
C  n
b(n  1)Hn 1  
1
b
 Cu   1
b
:
Proof. The argument uses a backwards growth process similar to that used in Section
V of [39]. Assume the process is in steady state, i.e. the process started at  1.
Consider user i. Let Bi(t) be the set of users whose states at time  t reach user i by
time 0. Note that Bi(0) = fig. By stationarity and the independence of the publishing
and consulting processes, P[Dji > t] = P[j =2 Bi(t)]: Now let Aji = infft : j 2 Bi(t)g.
Note that fj =2 Bi(t)g = fAji > tg: Thus P[Dji > t] = P[Aji > t]; i.e. Dji and
Aji are identically distributed. Now let A(k)i = infft : jBi(t)j = k + 1g: Note that
fA(k)i : 1  k  n  1g are the order statistics of fAji : j 2 f1; : : : ng n figg.
If we reverse the arrow of time at time 0, then Bi(t) is the set of infected users at
time s in the SI epidemic spreading model where an infected user j contaminates a
susceptible user ` at rate by`j. It then follows that Wki , A(k)i   A(k 1)i is exponen-
tially distributed with parameter ki given by
ki = b
X
j2Bi(A(k 1)i)
`=2Bi(A(k 1)i)
yj`  bjBi(A(k 1)i)j = bk;
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and hence EWki  (bk) 1. It follows that
Ci =
1
n  1
X
j:j 6=i
EDji =
1
n  1
X
j:j 6=i
EAji
=
1
n  1
n 1X
k=1
EA(k)i =
1
n  1
n 1X
k=1
kX
`=1
EW`i
 1
n  1
n 1X
k=1
kX
`=1
1
b`
=
n
b(n  1)Hn 1  
1
b
:
The desired result follows by averaging over Ci.
4.3.3 Expander Network
We now consider a network characterized by an expander graph, which might be
considered more realistic. An expander graph is a sparse graph with strong connec-
tivity properties. An example is a d-regular graph which is often used in modeling
social networks.
Finding a Nash equilibrium when the topology is an expander graph turns out to
be quite complex. We thus consider approximate Nash equilibria. We dene a user's
strategy to be an -approximate NE if the cost to the user under this strategy is no
worse than  more than the cost of any other strategy [58]. More formally, the prole
by is an -approximate NE if for any k and any eyk 2 k,
Ck(by)  + Ck(eyk; by k):
The -approximate price of stability is dened by (4.4) with   replaced by  , the set
of -approximate NE.
Suppose G is an expander network with bounded degree. We now show that the
prole where users implement a uniform allocation of their budget of attention is an
approximate NE.
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Theorem 4.3.9. In any network with homogeneous content creation rates  and
budgets of attention b, the uniform prole is a d 1
b
-approximate Nash equilibrium,
where d = maxk dk is the maximum degree of the graph.
Proof. Consider user `. For a given j,
Dj`(y`;y `) = min
k2N(`)

1
yk`
Xk` + Y
`
jk

;
where fXk`g are i.i.d. exponential random variable with parameter b, and Y `jk is the
time for an item originating from j to reach k without passing through `. Dene a
random variable K by K = minfk : Y `jk = mink Y `jkg: Since fY `jkg are independent
of fXk`g, so is K. Thus
EXK` =
X
k
E[Xk`]  P[K = k] = b 1:
We then have the following,
EDj`(u`;y `) = E

min
k2N(`)

d`Xk` + Y
`
jk
	  E d`XK` + Y `jK = d`b + E

min
k2N(`)
Y `jk

:
On the other hand,
EDj`(y`;y `) = E

min
k2N(`)

1
yk`
Xk` + Y
`
jk

 E

min
k2N(`)

1
yk`
Xk`

+ min
k2N(`)
Y `jk

=
1
b
+ E

min
k2N(`)
Y `jk

:
Thus
EDj`(u`;y `)  d`   1
b
+ EDj`(y`;y `):
Summing over j and then minimizing over y`, we obtain
C`(u`;y `)  d`   1
b
+ min
y`2`
C`(y`;y `);
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for any y `.
In view of Theorem 4.3.8, the next theorem shows that, for an expander network
with edge expansion bounded away from zero, the uniform prole is order optimal,
and hence the d-approximate price of stability is bounded.
Theorem 4.3.10. The social cost Cu of the uniform prole is bounded by
Cu  2d
bhG
Hbn=2c;
where d = maxi di, and hG is the edge expansion of G dened by
hG = minjAjV
j@Aj
minfjAj; jAcjg ;
with @A = f(u; v) 2 E : u 2 A; v 2 Acg.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as that for Theorem 4.3.6. The dierence is
that the exponential random variable Vjk in (4.11) now has parameter jk given by
jk = b
X
u2Fjk;v2F cjk
yuv  b
d
j@Fjkj  bhG
d
minfk; n  kg;
where Fjk is the set consisting of the rst k users that has got the content originating
from j, with Fj1 = fjg. Hence
X
i:i6=j
EDji 
n 1X
k=1
(n  1)d
bhGminfk; n  kg 
2d(n  1)
bhG
Hbn=2c:
The desired result follows by summing over j and dividing by n(n  1).
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4.4 Incentivizing Ecient Behavior
As we have just seen, topologies can be classied according to their performance
under optimal and selsh allocations as
(1). Ecient: These topologies have bounded PoS and optimal social cost of order
log n; they do not require additional mechanisms. Examples are expanders and
cliques.
(2). Inecient amenable: These topologies have high PoS yet low (logarithmic)
optimal social cost. As we shall show, incentive mechanisms can be introduced
to change users' behavior and reduce their otherwise inecient performance.
Examples are the k-ary tree with bounded degree (k = (1)), and with low-
scaling degree (k = (n);  1=2).
(3). Inecient suboptimal: These topologies show inecient content spread even un-
der socially optimal allocations. No mechanism that preserves the topology and
the budgets of attention can therefore lead to good performance. Examples are
line and star networks, and k-ary trees with high-scaling degree (k = (n); 
close to 1=2 and  > 1=2).
We now propose an incentive mechanism that will prove particularly appealing for
inecient amenable graphs.
4.4.1 The Plus-One mechanism
Our mechanism relies on using incentives as a form of feedback for reallocating
attention. Each receiver k, upon receiving useful information, sends a reward of 1,
that we call a +1, to each node involved in relaying this information from its source s.
Note that by useful information, we mean that the piece of information that arrived
earliest at r, among all copies of this information at r. Therefore, a node sends a +1
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to the neighbor through which the earliest copy was received. We now provide details
of this mechanism.
 Each receiver k, upon reception of useful information from source s, sends a +1k
to each node along the path to s that was involved in relaying that piece of infor-
mation. Each node i along this path then keeps a score Oij =
P
s;k:(j;i)2Ps k +1k,
where Ps k is the quickest (shortest) path from s to k. Note Ps k is random
and diers from one sample path to another.
{ The receiver is not required to know the topology of the network nor the
path to each source. A completely distributed implementation consists of
each receiver k sending a +1k to the neighbor through which it received the
useful information from s. Each node along the path would then aggregate
the +1s it receives along with its own +1 before sending the sum up to its
neighbor.
 At time intervals that are much longer than the slots over which +1s are sent,
each user i updates his allocation rates as follows,
yji(t+ 1) = yji(t)  t

ji(t) 
P
k ki(t)
di

; (4.12)
where
ji(t) =   1
n(n  1)yji(t)2O
i
j;
and with t such that
P1
t=0 t =1; limt!1 t = 0.
We refer to the +1s as incentives because, as feedback, they represent the impor-
tance of a link, thus the value of the incentive to provide to bring about a favorable
change in that link's allocation. In the present chapter we keep these incentives in
quite general forms, but they may be regarded as monetary or non-monetary. Non-
monetary incentives might include a form of reputation or recognition, such as in
networks like Klout [2]. In such networks, users receive votes that count towards
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their reputation or expertise, in return for some service (like answering questions)
they provide to other users. A gain in reputation incites users to respond favor-
ably when there is a possibility of receiving such votes. Note that such a method
incentivizes a user to \serve" other users, thus going beyond a selsh allocation of
attention.
The behavior induced by the Plus-One mechanism turns out to perform a stochas-
tic gradient descent. The +1s collected by a node that correspond to a link e indeed
serve to estimate the gradient of the cost with respect to the allocation on link e, xe.
We now show how ji is an estimate of the gradient of the cost:
@C
@yji
. For ease of
exposition we assume homogeneous budgets of attention (bi = 1 for all i) and content
creation rates (i = 1 for all i). Let fXe : e 2 Eg be a collection of i.i.d. exponential
random variable with parameter 1. The expected delay from source s to user k can
be written as follows,
EDsk(y) = E
24 X
e2Ps k
1
ye
Xe
35 :
Since the Xe's are dierent with probability one, for each realization of the Xe's, the
shortest path Ps k remains xed for small enough perturbations in the ye's. The
gradient of the average delay from s to k with respect to edge (j; i) can be estimated
as follows,
@EDsk
@yji
= E

1(j;i)2Ps k
 1
y2ji
Xji

;
where 1A is the indicator of A. From (4.3), the social cost is
C(y) =
1
n(n  1)
X
k2V
X
s:s6=k
EDsk:
Thus the gradient of the overall cost is then given by
@C
@yji
=   1
n(n  1)E
"
Xji
y2ji
X
s;k
1(j;i)2Ps k
#
:
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An estimator eji of @C@yji can then be written as follows,
bji =   1
n(n  1)y2ji
X
s;k
1(j;i)2Ps k :
Note that bji corresponds exactly to ji, with Oij =Ps;k 1(j;i)2Ps k .
A study of the convergence properties of the Plus-One mechanism requires a care-
ful analysis of the interchange of expectation and dierentiation, which will not be
pursued in the present chapter. Indeed results from simulations presented in Sec-
tion 4.5 show convergence for all graphs that we consider.
4.4.2 Inecient Suboptimal Graphs
The Plus-One mechanism performs well for the inecient amenable graphs: the
PoS is reduced and the cost under this distributed mechanism is very close to optimal,
as we will see in Section 4.5. For inecient suboptimal graphs, however, regardless
of the PoS, the optimal social cost is still quite high. Our results from Section 4.3
show that line and star networks, and k-ary trees with k = (n);  > 0, fall in
this category of graphs. For such topologies, incentive mechanisms that promote only
shifting of attention are not sucient. More complex mechanisms that change the
graph structure, or modify the budgets of attention of some nodes would seem more
suitable. We leave the study of such mechanisms for future work.
4.5 Simulation Results
We now perform simulations to verify our eciency results and validate the Plus-
One (PO) mechanism. For each network topology, we ran a discrete-event simulation
for three dierent scenarios. In the rst scenario, the PO mechanism is implemented,
so that the users are incentivized to minimize the social cost. In the second scenario,
the users behave selshly, so they optimize only for their own cost. The tuning of
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their allocation of attention is similar to the PO mechanism except that since there
is no reward from the downstream users, there is only a local optimization. In the
rst two scenarios, the initial allocation of attention is uniform for all users, which is
reasonable without prior knowledge of the network. In the third scenario, the users
do not tune their allocation, and maintain the uniform strategy.
We set the each user's publishing rate i to  = 1 and the budget of attention bi to
b = 1. The users update their allocation every 100 time units. We ran the simulation
for length of time long enough so that the network reaches steady state as illustrated
in Figure 4.1, which shows the average delay over time in a complete ternary tree
with 1093 nodes. The average is taken within a window of 100 time units, the same
as the interval between successive updates. We observe convergence around a small
set of values in all scenarios for all topologies we consider.
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Figure 4.1: Average delay over time in a complete ternary tree with 1093 nodes.
We now study the steady-state average delay for various network topologies. For
almost all cases we will plot the average delay derived from both theoretical and
simulation results. Figure 4.2 plots the average delay over increasing network size
for a line network. The PO mechanism indeed improves upon the selsh allocation,
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achieving a cost close to the theoretical optimal social cost. Note however that the
optimal social cost scales linearly with the network size. This line network is an
example of inecient suboptimal graphs that needs additional mechanisms beyond
PO to improve the linear cost.
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Figure 4.2: Average delay against network size for a line network.
Figure 4.3 plots the average delay against network size for complete k-ary trees
with k = 4. The PO mechanism achieves the theoretical optimal social cost, which
scales logarithmically with the network size. The social cost of the uniform strategy
is only slightly higher than the optimal social cost, though the gap is increasing as the
network size increases. In contrast, the cost for the selsh optimization is signicantly
higher, and increases much faster ( n1=2) with the network size. This topology is an
example of an inecient amenable graph shows the power of the PO mechanism, in
bringing the social cost down to one very close to the optimal cost.
Figure 4.4 plots the average delay in random 3-regular networks. Since random
d-regular graphs have good expansion property with high probability, we know from
Theorems 4.3.9 and 4.3.10 that the uniform strategy achieves a social cost that scales
logarithmically, and that it is a 3-approximate NE. Figure 4.4 shows that the costs
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Figure 4.3: Average delay against network size for complete quaternary tree.
associated with PO, selsh optimization and the uniform strategy actually coincide
for the network scales used in the simulation. This expander graph is an example of
the ecient graphs, where the diversity of paths leads to optimal social costs without
incentive mechanisms.
4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter has shown that social network topologies can be categorized into
three classes according to eciency of information spreading: ecient, inecient
amenable, and inecient suboptimal. This chapter has also proposed the Plus-
One mechanism, an incentive-based mechanism that brings the costs in inecient
amenable graphs close to optimal. Inecient suboptimal graphs, on the other hand,
are resilient to our mechanism, in that the cost under distributed attention allocation
is reduced close to the optimal social cost, but the optimal social cost itself is quite
high. For such graphs, mechanisms that go beyond incentives for attention shifting,
those that induce a change in graph structure or in the budgets of attention are
needed.
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Figure 4.4: Average delay against network size for random 3-regular network.
We have demonstrated the eectiveness of the Plus-One mechanism by simula-
tion. However, it will be of interest to have a formal investigation of its convergence
property and provable performance guarantee.
We have assumed in the present chapter that all users are interested in receiving
information from all sources. As an extension of the present chapter, we may con-
sider a more interesting and realistic case where users have diering sets of interests.
Mechanism design for such scenarios is decidedly more complex, with a more intricate
contact structure.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This thesis studied various aspects of networks characteristics and dynamics, with
focus on reciprocity, competition and information dissemination.
Chapter 2 investigated the maximum reciprocity problem and its use with re-
gard to the interpretation of empirical reciprocity in real networks. We proposed to
interpret empirical reciprocity based on its comparison with the maximum possible
reciprocity. We proved that the maximum reciprocity problem is NP-hard, so we did
the comparison with an upper bound instead. We found that this bound is surpris-
ingly close to the empirical reciprocity in a wide range of real networks, and that
there is a surprisingly strong linear relationship between the two. We demonstrated
that a particular type of small suboptimal motifs called 3-paths are the major cause
for suboptimality in real networks.
There are several future directions related to Chapter 2. Given the usefulness
and NP-hardness of the maximum reciprocity problem, it is of interest to design ap-
proximation algorithms with performance guarantee. The linear relationship between
empirical reciprocity and the upper bound is intriguing and invites a careful study
for its explanation. In Chapter 2, we xed the degree sequence. It will be useful to
consider small perturbation to the degree sequence and study the robustness of the
results. We focused on maximum reciprocity with given degree constraints. To get
a complete picture, it is necessary to study the full spectrum of reciprocity and in
particular its minimum. More broadly, there are many other network characteristics
of interest, whose interdependence is worthy of investigation.
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Chapter 3 analyzes competition dynamics under cumulative advantage. We char-
acterize the tail distributions of duration and intensity for pairwise competition under
cumulative advantage. We demonstrate that duration always has a power-law tail ir-
respective of competitors' tness, while intensity has either a power-law tail or an
exponential tail depending on whether the competitors are equally t. We observe
the struggle-of-the-tness phenomenon, where a slight dierent in tness results in
an extremely heavy tail of duration distribution.
For future work, it is of interest to close the gap between the asymptotic upper
and lower bounds for the duration distribution when the competitors are not equally
t. Another direction is to extend the results to more than two competitors and
eventually to the full network setting.
Chapter 4 studied the eciency of information dissemination in social networks
with limited budget of attention. We quantied the eciency of information dissem-
ination for both cooperative and selsh user behaviors in various network topologies.
We identied topologies where cooperation plays a critical role in ecient information
propagation. We proposed an incentive mechanism called \plus-one" to coax users
into cooperation in such cases, and demonstrated its eectiveness through simulation.
Future investigation is needed for the convergence property and provable perfor-
mance guarantee of the \plus-one" mechanism. An analysis of power-law networks
will be be valuable, since many social networks exhibit power-law degree distributions.
Another natural extension is to allow users to have diering sets of interests.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3.7
We adapt the proof for Theorem 2.2 of [16] that deals with packing two graphic
sequences for undirected graphs. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
V0 = V , since removing isolated vertices does not change the conclusion. Assume
that conditions (1){(3) hold and consider the set G of all pairs of digraphs (G1; G2)
such that
(i). G1 is symmetric with degree bi-sequence (d
0;d0),
(ii). G2 has degree bi-sequence (d
+   d0;d    d ),
(iii). the union G = G1 +G2, as a multi-digraph, has degree bi-squence (d
+;d ).
Note that G1 can be identied with an undirected graph with degree sequence d
0.
Conditions (1) and (2) guarantee that G 6= ;. Among all pairs in G, choose a pair
(G1; G2) such that the number of shared edges jG1 \G2j is minimized. We will show
that G1 \G2 = ;, so their union G = G1 +G2 is a realization of (d+;d ) and hence
(d+;d )  (G)  jG1j = 2
P
i d
0
i  2m. To this end, we will show that condition
(iii) would be violated if G1 \G2 6= ;.
Assume there exists an edge (x; y) 2 G1\G2. SinceG1 is required to be symmetric,
for the sake of notational simplicity, we will use the same notation (a; b) for a single
edge to refer to the pair of edges (a; b) and (b; a) in G1, which is represented pictorially
by an undirected edge.
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v w
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v w


(c)
Figure A.1: Proof of Claims 1{3. The number of shared edges is reduced by rewiring
the edges marked by red crosses into the dashed green edges. Each undirected edge
represents a pair of reciprocated edges.
For v 2 V , let NG(v) = fu : (v; u) 2 Gg be the out-neighbors of v in G and
N G (v) = fu : (u; v) 2 Gg the in-neighbors of v in G. Let NG(v) = N+G (v) [ N G (v)
be the neighbors of v in G. For W  V , let N+G (W ) =
S
w2W N
+
G (w), N
 
G (W ) =S
w2W N
 
G (w) and NG(W ) = N
+
G (W ) [ N G (W ). We use the convention N+G (;) =
N G (;) = NG(;) = ;. For V1; V2  V , let V1 
 V2 = f(v1; v2) 2 V1  V2 : v1 6= v2g.
Now consider I = V   [NG(x) [ NG(y)]. Let W 1 = NG1(I), W 2(I) = N+G2(I) \
N G2(I), W
+ = N+G2(I)   N G2(I) and W  = N G2(I)   N+G2(I). Note that NG(I) =
W 1 +W 2 +W+ +W .
We break the proof into several claims.
Claim 1. W 1  NG(x) \NG(y).
Proof. SupposeW 1 6= ;. Let w 2 W 1 and v 2 I such that (v; w) 2 G1. If w =2 NG(x),
then G01 = G1   f(x; y); (v; w)g+ f(x;w); (y; v)g would reduce the number of shared
edges; see Figure A.1(a). Therefore, w 2 NG(x). Similarly, w 2 NG(y).
Claim 2. N+G2(I)  N+G (x).
Proof. Suppose N+G2(I) 6= ;. Let w 2 N+G2(I) and v 2 I such that (v; w) 2 G2. If
w =2 N+G (x), then G02 = G2 f(x; y); (v; w)g+f(x;w); (v; y)g would reduce the number
of shared edges; see Figure A.1(b). Therefore, w 2 N+G (x).
Claim 3. N G2(I)  N G (y).
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(a) w1; w2 2W 1.
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(b) w1 2 N G2(I); w2 2 N+G2(I).
Figure A.2: Proof of Claims 4{5. The number of shared edges is reduced by rewiring
the edges marked by red crosses into the dashed green edges. Each undirected edge
represents a pair of reciprocal edges.
Proof. Suppose N G2(I) 6= ;. Let w 2 N G2(I) and v 2 I such that (w; v) 2 G2. If
w =2 N G (y), then G02 = G2 f(x; y); (v; w)g+f(x; v); (w; y)g would reduce the number
of shared edges; see Figure A.1(c). Therefore, w 2 N G (y).
It follows from Claims 2 and 3 that W 2  N+G (x) \ N G (y), W+  N+G (x) and
W   N G (y). Note that NG(I)  NG(x)[NG(y) = Ic. As a result, there is no edge
with both ends in I.
Claim 4. There exists an edge in G between every pair of distinct vertices in W 1.
Proof. Let w1; w2 2 W 1 and z1; z2 2 I such that (zi; wi) 2 G1 for i = 1; 2, where
z1 are z2 are not necessarily distinct. If (w1; w2) =2 G and (w2; w1) =2 G, then G01 =
G1 f(x; y); (w1; z1); (w2; z2)g+f(x; z1); (y; z2); (w1; w2)g would reduce the number of
shared edges; see Figure A.2(a). Therefore, either (w1; w2) 2 G or (w2; w1) 2 G.
Claim 5. N G2(I)
N+G2(I)  G.
Proof. Let (w1; w2) 2 N G2(I) 
 N+G2(I). Let z1; z2 2 I such that (w1; z1) 2 G2
and (z2; w2) 2 G2, where z1 are z2 are not necessarily distinct. If (w1; w2) =2 G,
then G02 = G2   f(x; y); (w1; z1); (z2; w2)g + f(x; z1); (z2; y); (w1; w2)g would reduce
the number of shared edges; see Figure A.2(b). Therefore, (w1; w2) 2 G.
As a result of Claim 5, W 2 
W 2  G and W  
W+  G.
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(a) (w1; w2); (w2; w1) =2 G.
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(b) (w1; w2) =2 G; (w2; w1) 2 G.
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(c) (w1; w2) 2 G; (w2; w1) =2 G.
Figure A.3: Proof of Claim 6. The number of shared edges is reduced by rewiring
the edges marked by red crosses into the dashed green edges, where w1 2 W 1 and
w2 2 W 2. Each undirected edge represents a pair of reciprocal edges.
Claim 6. W 1 
W 2  G and W 2 
W 1  G.
Proof. Let w1 2 W 1, w2 2 W 2 be such that w1 6= w2. Let z1; z2; z3 2 I be such that
(w1; z1) 2 G1, (z3; w2) 2 G2 and (w2; z2) 2 G2, where z1; z2; z3 are not necessarily
distinct. We will show that if (w1; w2) =2 G or (w2; w1) =2 G, we would be able to
nd a new pair of graphs (G01; G
0
2) 2 G such that jG01 \G02j < jG1 \G2j, which would
contradict the choice of (G1; G2). Consider three cases.
(i). If (w1; w2) =2 G, (w2; w1) =2 G, then let
G01 = G1   f(x; y); (w1; z1)g+ f(x; z1); (w1; w2)g;
G02 = G2   f(z3; w2); (w2; z2)g+ f(z3; y); (y; z2)g;
see Figure A.3(a).
(ii). If (w1; w2) =2 G, (w2; w1) 2 G, then let
G01 = G1   f(w1; z1)g+ f(w1; w2)g;
G02 = G2   f(x; y); (z3; w2); (w2; w1)g+ f(z3; y); (x; z1); (z1; w1)g;
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see Figure A.3(b).
(iii). If (w1; w2) 2 G, (w2; w1) =2 G, then let
G01 = G1   f(w1; z1)g+ f(w1; w2)g;
G02 = G2   f(x; y); (w1; w2); (w2; z2)g+ f(x; z2); (w1; z1); (z1; x)g;
see Figure A.3(c).
Therefore, (w1; w2) 2 G, (w2; w1) 2 G.
Claim 7.   3.
Proof. Note that   2 since d+x + d x   d0x  d+x  2. If  = 2, then NG(x) = fyg
and NG(y) = fxg. Thus NG(I)  fx; yg. But x; y =2 NG(I) by the denition of I.
Therefore, NG(I) = ;, and hence d+v = d v = 0 for every v 2 I = V   fx; yg. It then
follows that  =  = 2 and n = 2. A direct calculation shows that condition (3) is
violated. Therefore,   3.
Now consider the cut (I; Ic). Let W 0 = W 1 [W 2. Let w0 = jW 0j, w+ = jW+j,
w  = jW j. We will count the number of edges across the cut in a special way. An
edge from G2 in either direction is counted as one edge, while a pair of reciprocal
edges from G1 is counted as one edge. Note that the number of edges across the cut
is bounded by
E(I; Ic)  jIj = (n  jIcj);
since each vertex in I contributes at least  edges. Note that jNG(x)j     1 and
jNG(y)j   1, since the edge (x; y) has multiplicity 2. Since W 0  NG(x)\NG(y),
jIcj = jNG(x) [NG(y)j = jNG(x)j+ jNG(y)j   jNG(x) \NG(y)j  2  2  w0;
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and hence
E(I; Ic)  (n  2 + 2 + w0):
On the other hand, each vertex inW 0 must connect to x; y and every other vertex
in W 0, and hence contributes at most    1   w0 edges to E(I; Ic). Each vertex
in W+ must connect to x and every vertex in W , and hence contributes at most
   1   w  edges to E(I; Ic). Similarly, every vertex in W  contributes at most
  1  w+ edges to E(I; Ic). Therefore,
E(I; Ic)  w0(  1  w0) + w+(  1  w ) + w (  1  w+):
Combining the two inequalities for E(I; Ic), we obtain
f(w0; w+; w )  (n  2 + 2);
where
f(w0; w+; w ) = w0(     1  w0) + w+(  1  w ) + w (  1  w+):
Note that w0 + w+  jNG(x)   fygj     2. Similarly w0 + w      2. If we
maximize f subject to these feasibility constraints, the inequality should still hold.
Claim 8. The maximum value of f(w0; w+; w ) subject to the following constraints
w0 + w+    2;
w0 + w     2;
w0; w+; w   0;
is f ? = (  2)(  1).
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Proof. Note that f ? is achieved by w0 = w  = 0 and w+ =    2. Thus it remains
to show that f  f ? for all feasible (w0; w+; w ). For xed w0 and w+, f is linear
in w , where w  2 [0;   2   w0]. Thus in order to maximize f , we only need to
consider w  2 f0;   2   w0g. By the same argument, we only need to consider
w+ 2 f0;  2 w0g. Since f is symmetric in w+ and w , we only need to consider
three cases.
(i). w+ = w  = 0. In this case, 0  w0    2, and
f(w0; 0; 0) = w0(     1  w0)  (  2)(     1) < f ?:
(ii). w  = 0 and w+ =   2  w0. In this case,
f(w0; w+; 0) = w0(  1 w0)+( 2 w0)( 1) = f ? w0(w0+)  f ?:
(iii). w+ = w  =   2  w0. In this case,
f(w0; w+; w ) = w0(     1  w0) + 2(  2  w0)(w0 + 1)
= w0(3     7  3w0) + 2(  2)
 w0(3  8  3w0) + 2(  2):
If  = 3, then w0 2 f0; 1g and
f(w0; w+; w )  w0(1  3w0) + 2  2 = f ?:
If   4, set w0 = (3  8)=6 and
f(w0; w+; w )  1
12
(3  8)2 + 2(  2):
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Thus
f ?   f  (  1)(  2)  1
12
(3  8)2   2(  2) = 1
4
(  4) + 2
3
 0:
Therefore, f  f ? for all feasible (w0; w+; w ), which completes the proof.
Now we have
(  1)(  2) = f ?  (n  2 + 2);
and hence
 
s
n+

   1
2
2
+
3
2
  :
which violates condition (3). Therefore, G1 \G2 = ; as desired.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
Let G(i) and S(i) be the digraph G and the set S before the i-th iteration of the
while loop of lines 2{10. Given a vertex v, let 
(i)
v be the set of 3-paths in G(i)
that starts at v, and ~
(i)
v  (i)v the set of non-Type IV 3-paths. We rst prove the
following: If ~
(i)
v 6= ;, then v 2 S(i). This trivially holds for i = 1 since S(1) = V .
Assume it holds for the i-th iteration. Consider the (i + 1)-st iteration. Let w0 be
such that ~
(i+1)
w0 6= ;. Let v0 the node picked on line 3 of the i-th iteration. Consider
two cases.
(1). Suppose the condition on line 4 is false. In this case, G(i+1) = G(i) and hence
~
(i)
w0 = ~
(i+1)
w0 6= ;. Thus w0 6= v0, and, by the induction hypothesis, w0 2 S(i).
By line 8, S(i+1) = S(i)   fv0g, so w0 2 S(i+1).
(2). Suppose the condition on line 4 is true. Let  = (v0; v1; v2; v3) be the 3-path
rewired in the i-th iteration. Since S(i+1) = S(i) [ fv1; v2g by line 6, by the
induction hypothesis, it suces to show that 
(i)
w0 6= ; for w0 =2 fv0; v1; v2; v3g.
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Assume w0 =2 fv0; v1; v2; v3g. If  is of Type III, then G(i+1)a  G(i)a and hence
; 6= ~(i+1)w0  ~(i)w0 . Now suppose  is of Type I or II. Pick a 3-path 1 =
(w0; w1; w2; w3) 2 ~(i+1)w0 . Note that the only edge in G(i+1)a n G(i)a is (v0; v3).
Since (w0; w3) =2 G(i+1)a and w0 6= v0, we obtain (w0; w3) =2 G(i)a . If 1 2 (i)w0 ,
then 1 2 ~(i)w0 . If 1 =2 (i)w0 , then either (w1; w2) or (w2; w3) must be the
newly added edge (v0; v3). Suppose (w1; w2) = (v0; v3). Then 2 = (w0; w1 =
v0; v1; v2) 2 (i)w0 . If (w0; v2) =2 G(i)a , then 2 2 ~(i)w0 . If (w0; v2) 2 G(i)a , then
3 = (w0; v2; v3 = w2; w3) 2 (i)w0 . Since (w0; w3) =2 G(i)a , 3 2 ~(i)w0 . Thus
~
(i)
w0 6= ; if (w1; w2) = (v0; v3). The same argument shows that ~(i)w0 6= ; if
(w2; w3) = (v0; v3). Therefore, ~
(i)
w0 6= ; for all cases.
Therefore, ~
(i)
v 6= ;, then v 2 S(i). When Algorithm 1 terminates, S = ;, so
there is no non-Type IV 3-paths. Now it remains to show that Algorithm 1 indeed
terminates. For this purpose, let Xi = jS(i+1)j   jS(i)j. Let Yi = 1 if if the i-th
iteration rewires some 3-path and Yi = 0 otherwise. Note that if Yi = 1, 0  Xi  2
and jG(i+1)a j  jG(i)a j   2; otherwise, Xi =  1 and jG(i+1)a j = jG(i)a j. After the i-th
iteration,
0  jG(i+1)a j  jG(1)a j   2
iX
j=1
Yj;
and hence 2
Pi
j=1 Yj  jG(1)a j  jEj. Thus
jS(i+1)j = jS(1)j+
iX
j=1
Xj
 jV j+ 2
iX
j=1
Yj  
iX
j=1
(1  Yi)
= jV j   i+ 3
iX
j=1
Yj
 jV j+ 3
2
jEj   i:
It follows that Algorithm 1 terminates in at most jV j+ 3
2
jEj iterations.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.4.8
We break the proof into several claims.
Claim 1. (E0 [ E1) \G?a = ;.
Proof. For k < `, let [vk; v`] be the sub-path of  from vk to v`. Suppose there exists
(vi; vj) 2 (E0 [ E1) \G?a. Note that i  j mod 2. If i < j, then [v0; vi] + (vi; vj) +
[vj; v2p] is a path of odd length 2p+1+i j, which requires (v0; v2p) 2 G?a by Lemma
2.4.3, a contradiction. If i > j, then [vj; vi]+(vi; vj) is a cycle inG
?
a. By Lemma 2.4.4,
this must be a 3-cycle and i = j+2. By symmetry, we can assume j  1. Lemma 2.4.5
applied to vj 1 and the 3-cycle (vj; vj+1; vi; vj) then requires (vj 1; vj+1) 2 G?a, which
we have just shown is impossible. Therefore, (E0 [ E1) \G?a = ;.
By virtue of Claim 1, a pair of edges (vi; vj) and (vj; vi) of E0[E1 are either both
in G? or both outside G?. Thus we only need to consider (vi; vj) 2 E0 [E1 for i < j.
Claim 2. Either (v0; v2p) 2 G? or (v1; v2p 1) 2 G?.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. By Claim 1, (v0; v2p) =2 G?u and (v1; v2p 1) =2 G?u. Let
H = G?   f(v0; v1); (v2p 1; v2p)g + f(v0; v2p); (v2p 1; v1)g. Then (H) = (G?) and
hence H is also a maximum digraph. Now [v1; v2p 1] + (v2p 1; v1) is a (2p  1)-cycle
in Ha. If p > 2, this contradicts Lemma 2.4.4. If p = 2, this contradicts Lemma 2.4.5
since (v0; v1) =2 Ha but (v0; v2p 1) 2 Ha by applying Lemma 2.4.3 to [v0; v2p 1].
Claim 3. If (v0; v2p) 2 G?, then G? \ E1 = ; and E0  G?.
Proof. Suppose (v2i 1; v2j 1) 2 G?, where j > i  1. Note that (v2i 1; v2p) 2 G?a by
Lemma 2.4.3. Then C = [v0; v2j 1]+ (v2j 1; v2i 1; v2p; v0) satises the assumption of
Lemma 2.4.6. Thus there exists an H 2 G(d+;d ) with (H) = (G?) + 2(j   1) >
(G), a contradiction. Therefore, (v2i 1; v2j 1) =2 G? and hence E1 \G? = ;.
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

(a) p = 3; i = 1; j = 2.
v0 v1
v2
v3v4

(b) p = 2; i = 0; j = 1.
Figure A.4: Proof of Claim 3. Reciprocity can be increased by rewiring the edges
marked by red crosses into the dashed green edges.
Suppose (v2i; v2j) =2 G?, where i < j. Since (v0; v2p) 2 G?, either i  1 or j  p 1.
By symmetry, we may assume that j  p  1. Let
H = G?   f(v2k 1; v2k)gi=2k=1   f(v2k; v2k+1)gp 1k=j=2   f(v2p; v0)g
+ f(v2k 1; v2k 2)gi=2k=1 + f(v2k; v2k 1)gpk=j=2+1 + f(v2j; v2i)g;
see Figures A.4. Then H 2 G(d+;d ) and (H) = (G?)+ 2i+2(p  1  j)  (G?).
Thus H is also a maximum digraph, i = 0 and j = p   1. Now (v0; v1; : : : ; v2j; v0)
is a cycle of length 2j + 1 = 2p   1 in Ha. This contradicts Lemma 2.4.4 if p > 2.
For p = 2, by applying Lemma 2.4.5 to v3 and the 3-cycle (v0; v1; v2; v0), we obtain
(v1; v3) 2 Ha, contradicting E1\G? = ;; see Figure A.4(b). Therefore, (v2i; v2j) 2 G?
and hence E0  G?.
Claim 4. If (v1; v2p 1) 2 G?, then G? \ E0 = ; and E1  G?.
Proof. First consider the case p  3. Claim 3 applied to [v1; v2p 1] yields E1  G?
and (v2i; v2j) =2 G? for i  1 and j  p   1. It remains to show (v2i; v2j) =2 G?
for i = 0 or j = p. By symmetry, we only need to show (v0; v2j) =2 G?. Suppose
(v0; v2j) 2 G?. Consider the cycle C = (v0; v3)+[v3; v2p 1]+(v2p 1; v1; v2j; v0), which
has length 2p and satises the assumption of Lemma 2.4.6. Note that C \ G?s =
f(v2p 1; v1); (v2j; v0)g. Lemma 2.4.6 then yields an H 2 G(d+;d ) with (H) =
(G?) + 2p  4 > (G?), a contradiction. Thus (v0; v2j) =2 G? and E0 \G? = ;.
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Figure A.5: Proof of Claim 4. Reciprocity can be increased by rewiring the edges
marked by red crosses into the dashed green edges.
For p = 2, E1  G? trivially. By Claim 3, (v0; v4) =2 G?. To show E0 \G? = ;, by
symmetry, we only need to show (v0; v2) =2 G?. Suppose (v0; v2) 2 G?. Let
H = G?   f(v0; v1); (v2; v0); (v3; v4)g+ f(v3; v0); (v0; v4); (v2; v1)g;
see Figure A.5. Then H 2 G(d+;d ) and (H) = (G) + 1, a contradiction. Thus
(v0; v2) =2 G? and E0 \G? = ;.
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APPENDIX B
DATASETS IN SECTION 2.5
Table B.1: Statistics of some real networks. The datasets without explicit citations
are from the SNAP repository [52]. This table shows for each network the number of
nodes (column 2), the number of edges (column 3), the number of reciprocal edges
(column 4), the number of reciprocal edges in a 3-path optimal digraph returned
by the GreedyRewire algorithm on page 20 (column 5), and the upper bound in
Proposition 2.3.1 (column 6).
Network Nodes Edges Reciprocal Edges
Observed Algo. 1 Bound
Biological networks
C. Elegan [73, 74] 297 2345 394 1364 1467
Mouse-Cortex [80] 49 964 656 804 825
Protein [70] 6339 34814 4216 22066 23630
Yeast [68] 6725 201775 1090 6446 8835
A. Thaliana [76] 10134 15580 12 40 77
Communication networks
email-EuAll 265214 418956 108950 128192 143287
wiki-Talk 2394385 5021410 723690 1219196 1285201
Product co-purchasing networks
amazon0302 262111 1234877 670170 801530 858907
amazon0312 400727 3200440 1701142 1945350 2079813
amazon0505 410236 3356824 1834774 2092700 2227333
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Table B.1: (continued)
Network Nodes Edges Reciprocal Edges
Observed Algo. 1 Bound
amazon0601 403394 3387388 1887960 2130012 2266214
Social networks
Epinions1 75879 508837 206194 299778 317821
Slashdot0811 77360 828161 717962 731044 737201
Slashdot0902 82168 870161 731862 749436 758751
Pokec 1632803 30622564 16641200 21997368 22813049
wiki-Vote 7115 103689 5854 31126 35989
LiveJournal1 4847571 68475391 51248308 55619590 56984610
LiveJournal [56] 5204176 76937805 56456064 61806458 63451685
Flickr [56] 1715255 22613980 14117878 16401174 16998181
YouTube [56] 1138499 4945382 3909878 3996410 4086949
Twitter [51] 41652230 1468364884 531703676 690897836 875520298
ego-Twitter 81306 1768135 851678 1112236 1179627
Google+ [35] 61858438 948605109 321728626 414578876 443168800
ego-Google+ 107614 13673453 2870336 4954418 5481158
Stackoverow [77] 1749197 11894846 26558 2445802 2965936
Web graphs
BerkStan 685230 7600595 1902250 2257148 2913141
Google 875713 5105039 1565976 2106234 2460500
NotreDame 325729 1469679 759142 821340 907239
Stanford 281903 2312497 639722 770266 983414
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Table B.1: (continued)
Network Nodes Edges Reciprocal Edges
Observed Algo. 1 Bound
Wikipedia [1]
English 4709883 328267748 176523698 215049808 227103696
Swedish 1946669 49061638 10296750 12792974 13689733
Dutch 1794354 50061183 19993040 23471168 25078755
German 1738087 69385800 28079234 38594032 41799602
French 1555872 87231786 38347858 49859546 53102549
Russian 1163335 68613850 35807558 42472180 44437671
Italian 1160082 85261756 48584200 55921822 58593672
Spanish 1109589 32489175 4927794 10429430 11654906
Polish 1072883 51993365 28351902 32917546 34433059
Japanese 936882 61591797 26512542 36239836 38326442
Portuguese 841064 39840808 19062374 23016802 24224634
Chinese 781344 49703600 31848356 36082340 37248389
Korean 290291 15595628 9318976 10859386 11281173
P2P networks
Gnutella04 10876 39994 0 13878 16371
Gnutella05 8846 31839 0 9584 11830
Gnutella06 8717 31525 0 9606 11825
Gnutella08 6301 20777 0 5604 6947
Gnutella09 8114 26013 0 7064 8822
Gnutella24 26518 65369 0 19142 23920
Gnutella25 22687 54705 0 15292 19016
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Table B.1: (continued)
Network Nodes Edges Reciprocal Edges
Observed Algo. 1 Bound
Gnutella30 36682 88328 0 25386 31236
Gnutella31 62586 147892 0 40564 50227
Call Graph [66]
DrJava 1702 2920 4 778 1056
Endeavour 724 2067 2 358 519
FreeMind 237 623 18 140 217
JabRef 868 1532 2 340 523
jEdit 2222 5172 10 1286 1793
JForum 716 1506 2 248 364
JPetStore 222 328 0 30 42
Kunagi 781 1345 6 348 599
logicaldoc 892 3682 0 194 304
Makagiga 1777 4075 8 1106 1440
OpenKM 1390 2525 0 384 491
openproj 2824 4866 2 1428 1823
OpenSyncro 658 1271 2 216 327
SweetHome3D 1118 2363 12 558 844
weka 911 1737 2 392 581
Linux [75] 12391 33553 316 7982 10933
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APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3
This appendix provides proofs for the main results in Section 3.4. We will use the
following additional notations and denitions.
 Denote the transition probability from state (x0; y0) to state (x; y) in t = x +
y   x0   y0 steps by
pr(x0; y0;x; y) = P(x0;y0)CA;r [(Xt; Yt) = (x; y)]:
Note that the transition probability is nonzero only for this specic t. Thus we
will often omit to mention t explicitly hereafter and assume that the appropriate
t has been chosen.
 Let n be the time of the n-th tie, which can be dened recursively by 0 =  1
and
n = infft > n 1 : Xt = Ytg; n  1:
Note that T = N .
 Denote by qr(x0; y0) the probability of having no tie after leaving state (x0; y0),
i.e.,
qr(x0; y0) = P(x0;y0)CA;r [Xt 6= Yt; t  1]:
Note that qr(x0; x0) = P(x0;x0)CA;r [2 = 1] and qr(x0; y0) = P(x0;y0)CA;r [1 = 1] for
x0 6= y0.
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 Denote by An;t(x; y) the set of paths that start from (x; y) at time 0 and end
with the n-th tie at time t, i.e., n = t.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3.4.1
Note that the CA= model is the standard Polya urn model. The proof of The-
orem 3.4.1 combines known results for this model. Starting from the initial state
(x0; y0), Xt has a beta-binomial distribution with parameters x0 and y0 [45]. Note
that the event Xt = Yt occurs only if t = jx0   y0j + 2k for some integer k  0. For
such t, Xt = Yt if and only if Xt = z0 + k, where z0 = maxfx0; y0g. By Eq. (6.27) of
[45],
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [Xt = Yt] = P
(x0;y0)
CA;1 [Xt = z0 + k] =
B(z0 + k; z0 + k)
B(x0; y0)

t
k

: (C.1)
Recall that q1(x; y) is the probability of having no tie after leaving state (x; y). Thus
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T = t] = P
(x0;y0)
CA;1 [Xt = Yt]  q1(z0 + k; z0 + k); (C.2)
where the second factor on the right-hand side is the probability of having no tie after
t.
Recall that the exit probability E(x; y) in [6] is the probability of ever having a
tie starting from (x; y), including the initial state (x; y). Thus for x 6= y, q1(x; y) is
related to E(x; y) by
q1(x; y) = 1  E(x; y):
Using Eq. (22) of [6] for E(x; y), we obtain
q1(x+ 1; x) = q1(x; x+ 1) =
 (x+ 1=2)
 (x+ 1) (1=2)
:
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However, q1(x; x) 6= E(x; x) = 1. By considering the one-step transition from (x; x)
to (x+ 1; x) or (x; x+ 1), we obtain
q1(x; x) =
1
2
q1(x+ 1; x) +
1
2
q1(x; x+ 1) =
 (x+ 1=2)
 (x+ 1) (1=2)
:
Eliminating  (x+ 1=2) by the identity
 (2x) =  1=222x 1 (x) (x+ 1=2)
in [60, Eq. (5.5.5)], and using  (x+ 1) = x (x) and  (1=2) =
p
, we obtain
q1(x; x) =
 (2x)
x22x 1 (x) (x)
=
1
x22x 1B(x; x)
: (C.3)
Substitution of Eqs. (C.1) and (C.3) into Eq. (C.2) yields
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T = t] =
1
B(x0; y0)
 1
(z0 + k)22k+2z0 1

t
k

:
For t = jx0   y0j+ 2k, Stirling's formula yields

t
k


r
2

t 1=22t;
and hence
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T = t] 
1
2x0+y0 5=2
p
B(x0; y0)
t 3=2: (C.4)
It is well-known that as t!1, Xt=(Xt+Yt) converges almost surely to a beta random
variable V . It follows that jXt  Ytj=(Xt + Yt)! j2V   1j. Thus, for V 6= 1=2, which
holds almost surely, we have jXt Ytj=(Xt+Yt) > 0 for all large enough t. Therefore,
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T =1] = 0. Summing over t in Eq. (C.4), we obtain as t!1,
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T  t] =
1X
t0=t
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T = t
0]
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 1
2
1X
s=t
1
2x0+y0 5=2
p
B(x0; y0)
s 3=2
 1
2
Z 1
t
1
2x0+y0 5=2
p
B(x0; y0)
s 3=2ds
=
1
2x0+y0 5=2
p
B(x0; y0)
t 1=2;
where we have used the fact that half of the terms are zero in the second step, andP1
s=t s
 a  R1
t
s ads in the third step. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.1.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 3.4.2
Similar to Eq. (C.2), we have
P(x0;y0)CA;r [T = t] = pr(x0; y0; z0 + k; z0 + k)  qr(z0 + k; z0 + k): (C.5)
Thus the proof here amounts to nding expressions for both pr(x0; y0; z0 + k; z0 + k)
and qr(z0 + k; z0 + k) in CA 6=. We break the proof into three lemmas.
Lemma C.2.1.
pr(x0; y0;x0 + k; y0 + h)  (x0)k(y0)h
(rx0 + y0)k+h

k + h
k

; (C.6)
for all k  0; h  0.
Lemma C.2.2.
pr(x0; y0; x0 + k; y0 + h)  (x0)k(y0)h
(r 1)k(rx0 + y0)h
; (C.7)
for all k  0; h  0.
Lemma C.2.3. For r > 1,
qr(x; x)! r   1
r + 1
; (C.8)
as x!1.
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Before proving these lemmas, we rst use them to prove Theorem 3.4.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.2. By Lemma C.2.1, we have
pr(x0; y0; z0 + k; z0 + k)
 (x0)k+z0 x0(y0)k+z0 y0
(rx0 + y0)2k+2z0 x0 y0

2k + 2z0   x0   y0
k + z0   x0

=
 (rx0 + y0)
 (x0) (y0)
  (k + z0) (k + z0)
 (k + z0   x0 + 1) (k + z0   y0 + 1) 
 (2k + 2z0   x0   y0 + 1)
 (2k + 2z0 + (r   1)x0)
Using the relation  (k + a)= (k + b)  ka b as k !1, we obtain
pr(x0; y0; z0 + k; z0 + k) &
 (rx0 + y0)
2x0+y0 2 (x0) (y0)
(2k) (r 1)x0 1
= 2(r + 1)x0'1(2k)
 (r 1)x0 1;
where '1 is given by Eq. (3.4). Application of this asymptotic bound and Lemma
C.2.3 to Eq. (C.5) yields
P(x0;y0)CA;r [T = t] & 2(r   1)x0'1t (r 1)x0 1: (C.9)
Note that P(x0;y0)CA;r [T = +1] = P(x0;y0)CA;r [N = +1] = 0, where the second equality will
follow from Theorem 3.4.4, so we will not provide a separate proof here. Summing
over t in Eq. (C.9) and noting that half of the terms are zero, we obtain as t!1,
P(x0;y0)CA;r [T  t] =
1X
t0=t
P(x0;y0)CA;r [T = t
0] &
Z 1
t
(r   1)x0'1s (r 1)x0 1ds = '1t (r 1)x0 ;
establishing the lower bound.
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In a similar way, Lemma C.2.2 yields
pr(x0; y0; z0 + k; z0 + k) . 2(r + 1)(x0   r 1)'2(2k) (r 1)(x0 r 1) 1;
where '2 is given by Eq. (3.5). Application of this asymptotic bound and Lemma
C.2.3 to Eq. (C.5) yields
P(x0;y0)CA;r [T = t] . 2(r   1)(x0   r 1)'2t (r 1)(x0 r
 1) 1;
and
P(x0;y0)CA;r [T  t] =
1X
t0=t
P(x0;y0)CA;r [T = t
0] . '2t (r 1)(x0 r
 1);
establishing the upper bound.
Now we prove the lemmas. Recall that the transition probability p(x0; y0;x; y) of
going from (x0; y0) to (x; y) satises the following recursion (Chapman-Kolmogorov
equation),
pr(x0; y0; x; y) =
r(x  1)
r(x  1) + ypr(x0; y0;x  1; y) +
y   1
rx+ y   1pr(x0; y0; x; y   1);
(C.10)
for x  x0, y  y0 and x+y  x0+y0+1, with the boundary condition pr(x0; y0;x; y) =
0 for x < x0 or y < y0. Note that we have replaced the one-step transition probabilities
QCA;r(x  1; y;x; y) and QCA;r(x; y   1;x; y) by the expressions in Eq. (3.1).
Proof of Lemma C.2.1. We will use the short-hand notation p(k; h) for pr(x0; y0;x0+
k; y0+h), and  (k; h) for the right-hand side of Eq. (C.6). We rst prove the boundary
case for k = 0. By Eq. (C.10), for h  1,
p(0; h) =
y0 + h  1
rx0 + y0 + h  1p(0; h  1);
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which is a simple recursion in h and can be expanded to yield
p(0; h) =
(y0)h
(rx0 + y0)h
p(0; 0) =
(y0)h
(rx0 + y0)h
=  (0; h);
which yields Eq. (C.6) for k = 0 and h  1. Here we have used p(0; 0) = pr(x0; y0;x0; y0) =
1.
Similarly, for the other boundary case h = 0; k  1, we have
p(k; 0) =
(x0)k
(x0 + r 1y0)k
p(0; 0) =
(x0)k
(x0 + r 1y0)k
 (x0)k
(rx0 + y0)k
=  (k; 0);
where the last inequality is because (x)k increases with x, and x0+ r
 1y0  rx0+ y0.
For the general case, we use induction on k+h. The base case k+h = 1 is already
proven, since either k = 0 or h = 0 when k + h = 1. Assume Eq. (C.6) holds for
k+ h = m  1. Consider k+ h = m+ 1. We can also assume k  1 and h  1, since
we have proven the boundary cases for k = 0 or h = 0. The recursion in Eq. (C.10)
yields
p(k; h) =
r(x0 + k   1)
rk + h+ c0   rp(k   1; h) +
y0 + h  1
rk + h+ c0   1p(k; h  1)
 r(x0 + k   1)
rk + h+ c0   1p(k   1; h) +
y0 + h  1
rk + h+ c0   1p(k; h  1);
where c0 = rx0 + y0.
Applying the induction hypothesis p(k   1; h)   (k   1; h) and p(k; h   1) 
 (k; h  1) to the above inequality yields
p(k; h)  r(x0 + k   1)
rk + h+ c0   1 (k   1; h) +
y0 + h  1
rk + h+ c0   1 (k; h  1)
=
(rk + h)(k + h+ c0   1)
(k + h)(rk + h+ c0   1) (k; h);
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where in the last step we have used
 (k   1; h) = k
k + h
 k + h+ c0   1
x0 + k   1  (k; h);
and
 (k; h  1) = h
k + h
 k + h+ c0   1
y0 + h  1  (k; h):
To complete the proof, it suces to show that
(rk + h)(k + h+ c0   1)
(k + h)(rk + h+ c0   1)  1;
but this is equivalent to r  1, which is true by assumption.
Proof of Lemma C.2.2. The proof of Lemma C.2.2 follows the same line of reasoning
as that used to prove Lemma C.2.1. The boundary cases can be veried directly. We
only outline the induction step here. Applying Eq. (C.7) to the right-hand side of
Eq. (C.10) yields
p(k; h)  r(x0 + k   1)
rk + h+ c0   r 
(x0)k 1(y0)h
(r 1)k 1(c0)h
+
y0 + h  1
rk + h+ c0   1 
(x0)k(y0)h 1
(r 1)k(c0)h 1
=

r(r 1 + k   1)
rk + h+ c0   r +
c0 + h  1
rk + h+ c0   1

(x0)k(y0)h
(r 1)k(c0)h
:
Note that
r(r 1 + k   1)
rk + h+ c0   r +
c0 + h  1
rk + h+ c0   1 
r(r 1 + k   1)
rk + h+ c0   r +
c0 + h  1
rk + h+ c0   r = 1;
which completes the induction.
Proof of Lemma C.2.3. Recall that An;2k(x; x) is the set of paths that start from (x; x)
at time 0 and end with the n-th tie at time 2k, i.e., n = 2k. Let An;2k = An;2k(0; 0).
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Note that the paths in An;2k(x; x) are exactly the paths in An;2k translated by (x; x).
Let ~ 2 An;2k and its state at time t be ~t = (~xt; ~yt). The translation of ~ by (x; x),
denoted x + ~, is a path in An;2k(x; x), whose probability in the CA model is given
by
P(x;x)CA;r[x+ ~] =
2k 1Y
j=0

r(x+ ~xj)
r(x+ ~xj) + (x+ ~yj)
~xj+1 ~xj  (x+ ~yj)
r(x+ ~xj) + (x+ ~yj)
~yj+1 ~yj
:
For xed k and ~, as x!1, P(x;x)CA;r[x+ ~] converges to
2k 1Y
j=0

r
r + 1
~xj+1 ~xj  1
r + 1
~yj+1 ~yj
= P(0;0)RW;r[~];
which corresponds to the probability of the path ~ in a random walk with parameter
r=(r + 1). Thus, as x!1,
P(x;x)CA;r[n = 2k] =
X
~2An;2k
P(x;x)CA;r[x+ ~]!
X
~2An;2k
P(0;0)RW;r[~] = P
(0;0)
RW;r[n = 2k]:
After summing over k and using the Dominated Convergence Theorem, we obtain
P(x;x)CA;r[n <1] =
1X
k=1
P(x;x)CA;r[n = 2k]!
1X
k=1
P(0;0)RW;r[n = 2k] = P
(0;0)
RW;r[n <1]:
In particular,
qr(x; x) = 1  P(x;x)CA;r[2 <1]! 1  P(0;0)RW;r[2 <1] =
r   1
r + 1
;
where we have used Eq. (3.3) in [38] for P(0;0)RW;r[2 <1] in the last step.
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C.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4.3
Recall that An;t(x0; y0) is the set of paths starting from (x0; y0) that end with
the n-th tie at time t, i.e., n = t. We will use the short-hand notation An;t for
An;t(x0; y0). As in Section C.1, the set An;t is non-empty only if t = jx0  y0j+2k for
some integer k  n  1, in which case, every path in An;t ends in state (z0+ k; z0+ k)
with z0 = maxfx0; y0g. Recall from [6] that the probability of any path  connecting
states (x0; y0) and (x; y) is
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [] =
B(x; y)
B(x0; y0)
=
B(x; y)
B(x0; y0)
2tP(x0;y0)RW;1 []:
Summing over  2 An;t, where x = y = z0 + k, we obtain
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [n = t] =
B(z0 + k; z0 + k)
B(x0; y0)
2tP(x0;y0)RW;1 [n = t]: (C.11)
Thus the probability of having the n-th and also the last tie at time t is given by
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T = t; N = n] = P
(x0;y0)
CA;1 [n = t]  q1(z0 + k; z0 + k)
=
1
2x0+y0 2B(x0; y0)
 1
t+ x0 + y0
P(x0;y0)RW;1 [n = t]; (C.12)
where we have used Eqs. (C.11) and (C.3) in the last step. Note that P(x0;y0)RW;1 [n = t] is
the probability fn;t(d0) of the n-th visit to the origin at time t in a simple symmetric
random walk starting from d0 = jx0   y0j. Summing over t in (C.12), we obtain
P(x0;y0)CA;1 [N = n] =
1
2x0+y0 2B(x0; y0)
1X
k=n 1
1
2k + d0 + x0 + y0
fn;d0+2k(d0)
=
1
2x0+y0 2B(x0; y0)
Gn(1; d0); (C.13)
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where
Gn(z; d0) =
1X
k=n 1
1
2k + d0 + x0 + y0
fn;d0+2k(d0)z
d0+2k:
To simplify Gn(z; d0), we have
d
dz
[zx0+y0Gn(z; d0)] = z
x0+y0 1
1X
k=n 1
fn;d0+2k(d0)z
d0+2k = zx0+y0 1n(z; d0); (C.14)
where n(z; d0) =
P1
k=n 1 fn;d0+2k(d0)z
d0+2k is the generating function of the proba-
bility distribution of the n-th visit to the origin in a simple random walk starting from
d0. Let F1(z) be the generating function of the distribution of the time of the rst
return to the origin in a simple random walk starting from the origin. The standard
renewal argument (see e.g. XI.3.d of [28]) shows that n(z; d0) is given by
n(z; d0) = [1(z; 1)]
d0 [F1(z)]
n 1;
where 1(z; 1) and F1(z) are given by Eqs. (3.6) and (3.14) of [28, Chap. XI], respec-
tively. Therefore,
n(z; d0) = z
 d0

1 
p
1  z2
n+d0 1
: (C.15)
Substituting Eq. (C.15) into Eq. (C.14) and integrating from 0 to 1 yields
Gn(1; d0) =
Z 1
0
z2minfx0;y0g 1

1 
p
1  z2
n+d0 1
dz;
where we have used x0 + y0   d0 = 2minfx0; y0g. A change of variable u =
p
1  z2
yields
Gn(1; d0) =
Z 1
0
u(1  u2)minfx0;y0g 1(1  u)n+d0 1du;
which is upper bounded by
Gn(1; d0) 
Z 1
0
u(1  u)n+d0 1du = B(2; n+ d0); (C.16)
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and lower bounded by
Gn(1; d0) 
Z 1
0
u(1  u)minfx0;y0g 1(1  u)n+d0 1du = B (2; n+maxfx0; y0g   1) ;
(C.17)
where we have used minfx0; y0g+d0 = maxfx0; y0g. Applying Eqs. (C.16) and (C.17)
to Eq. (C.13) yields
B(2; n+maxfx0; y0g   1)
2x0+y0 2B(x0; y0)
 P(x0;y0)CA;1 [N = n] 
B(2; n+ d0)
2x0+y0 2B(x0; y0)
:
Note that P(x0;y0)CA;1 [N = 1] = P(x0;y0)CA;1 [T = 1] = 0. Summing over n and usingP1
m=nB(2;m) = n
 1, we obtain
1
2x0+y0 2B(x0; y0)
 1
n+maxfx0; y0g   1  P
(x0;y0)
CA;1 [N  n] 
1
2x0+y0 2B(x0; y0)
 1
n+ d0
;
which immediately yields Eq. (3.6).
C.4 Proof of Theorem 3.4.4
We rst prove the following lemma.
Lemma C.4.1. The probability P(x0;y0)CA;r [1 < 1] of ever having a tie is bounded as
follows,
P(x0;y0)CA;r [1 <1] 
8>><>>:
1; x0  y0;
(y0)x0 y0
(rx0+y0)x0 y0
 
1 + 1
r
x0 y0 ; x0 > y0:
Note that P(x0;y0)CA;r [1 <1] is the exit probability E(x; y) in [6] when r = 1.
Proof. The case x0 = y0 is trivial since 1 = 0. When x0 < y0, Theorem 3.21 of [42]
yields Yt=Xt ! 0 almost surely, from which it follows that Xt > Yt eventually and
hence P(x0;y0)CA;r [1 <1] = 1.
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Now assume x0 > y0. Recall that A1;t(x0; y0) is the set of paths starting from
(x0; y0) that end with the rst tie at time t. Note that A1;t(x0; y0) is nonempty only
if t = d0 + 2k, where d0 = x0   y0 and k  0. Let  2 A1;t(x0; y0) and its state at
time j be j = (xj; yj). The probability of the path  is given by
P(x0;y0)CA;r [] =
t 1Y
j=0

rxj
rxj + yj
xj+1 xj  yj
rxj + yj
yj+1 yj
=
rxt x0(x0)xt x0(y0)yt y0Qt 1
j=0(rxj + yj)
=
rxt x0(x0)xt x0(y0)yt y0Qt 1
j=0[(r   1)xj + x0 + y0 + j]
;
where in the last step we have used xj + yj = x0 + y0 + j. Note that P(x0;y0)CA;r [] is
maximized if the xj's are minimized, subject to the constraints that the xj's increase
monotonically from x0 to xt with step size 0 or 1, and that xj > yj for all 1  j  t 1,
or equivalently xj > x0 + (j   d0)=2. This is achieved by the following sequence,
xj =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
x0; j = 0; 1; : : : ; d0   1;
x0 + b(j   d0)=2c+ 1; j = d0; d0 + 1; : : : ; t  1;
xt; j = t:
The corresponding path  has probability
P(x0;y0)CA;r [
] =
d0 2Y
j=0
y0 + j
rx0 + y0 + j
xt 1Y
x=x0
rx
rx+ (x  1) 
x  1
r(x+ 1) + (x  1) 
xt   1
rxt + (xt   1) ;
which, after arrangement, yields,
P(x0;y0)CA;r [
] =
d0 1Y
j=0
y0 + j
rx0 + y0 + j
xt 1Y
x=x0
rx
(r + 1)x+ r
 x
(r + 1)x+ (r   1)
 (y0)d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
rxt x0
(r + 1)2(xt x0)
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=
(y0)d0(r + 1)
d0
(rx0 + y0)d0

r
r + 1
xt x0  1
r + 1
yt y0
=
(y0)d0(r + 1)
d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
P(x0;y0)RW;r []:
Thus we have
P(x0;y0)CA;r []  P(x0;y0)CA;r [] 
(y0)d0(r + 1)
d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
P(x0;y0)RW;r [];
and, after summing over  2 A1;t(x0; y0),
P(x0;y0)CA;r [1 = t] 
(y0)d0(r + 1)
d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
P(x0;y0)RW;r [1 = t]:
Summing over t, we obtain
P(x0;y0)CA;r [1 <1] 
(y0)d0(r + 1)
d0
(rx0 + y0)d0
P(x0;y0)RW;r [1 <1]:
By Eq. (3.9) and XI.3.d of [28], P(x0;y0)RW;r [1 < 1] = r d0 , from which the desired
conclusion follows.
Corollary C.4.2. The probability of having at least one more tie starting from a tie
state (x; x) is bounded by
P(x;x)CA;r[2 <1] 
2
r + 1
:
Proof. By considering the one-step transition from (x; x) into (x; x+1) or (x+1; x),
we obtain
P(x;x)CA;r[2 <1] =
r
r + 1
P(x+1;x)CA;r [1 <1] +
1
r + 1
P(x;x+1)CA;r [1 <1]
 x
(r + 1)x+ r
+
1
r + 1
 2
r + 1
;
where the rst inequality follows from Lemma C.4.1.
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Now we prove Theorem 3.4.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.4. Let Zn be the common value of Xt and Yt at t = n, i.e.,
Zn = Xn . Conditioned on n < 1 and Zn = z, the probability of n+1 < 1 is just
the probability of having a tie after leaving (z; z). Thus
P(x0;y0)CA;r [n+1 <1 j n <1; Zn = z] = P(z;z)CA;r[2 <1] 
2
r + 1
;
by Corollary C.4.2. Removal of the conditioning yields
P(x0;y0)CA;r [n+1 <1 j n <1] 
2
r + 1
:
It follows that
P(x0;y0)CA;r [N  n] = P(x0;y0)CA;r [n <1]
= P(x0;y0)CA;r [1 <1]
n 1Y
i=1
P(x0;y0)CA;r [i+1 <1 j i <1]
 P(x0;y0)CA;r [1 <1]

2
r + 1
n 1
:
An application of Lemma C.4.1 completes the proof.
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APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 4
This appendix provides proofs of the theorems in Section 4.3.1.
D.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3.1
Let pi = 
 1Pi
j=1 j. Note that 
 1i+1;i = 1   pi and  1i 1;i = pi 1. Also
note that ni;i+1 = i and ni;i 1 = n  i + 1. Thus the optimal social cost in (4.8) can
be rewritten as
C =
1
n  1
nX
i=1
1
bi
hp
i(1  pi) +
p
(n  i+ 1)pi 1
i2
 1
(n  1)bmax
nX
i=1
hp
i(1  pi) +
p
(n  i+ 1)pi 1
i2
:
The inequality (x+ y)2  x2 + y2 for xy  0 then yields
C  C
o
bmax
; (D.1)
where
Co =
1
n  1
nX
i=1
[i(1  pi) + (n  i+ 1)pi 1] : (D.2)
Let i = minfi : pi  1=2g. Since pi is increasing in i, we have pi < 1=2 for all i < i
and pi  1=2 for all i  i. Therefore,
Co  1
n  1
"
i 1X
i=1
1
2
i+
nX
i=i+1
1
2
(n  i+ 1)
#
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=
1
2(n  1)
"
i   n+ 1
2
2
+
n2   1
4
#
 n+ 1
8
; (D.3)
which, combined with (D.1), yields the lower bound in (4.9).
The cost under selsh allocation in (4.6) can be upper bounded as follows,
bC = 1
n  1
nX
i=1
1
bi
h
i
p
1  pi + (n  i+ 1)ppi 1
i p
1  pi +ppi 1

 1
(n  1)bmin
nX
i=1
h
i
p
1  pi + (n  i+ 1)ppi 1
i p
1  pi +ppi 1

=
1
(n  1)bmin
nX
i=1
h
i(1  pi) + (n  i+ 1)pi 1 + (n+ 1)
p
pi 1(1  pi)
i
=
Co + Cd
bmin
; (D.4)
where Co is as in (D.2) and
Cd =
n+ 1
n  1
n 1X
i=2
p
pi 1(1  pi): (D.5)
Since
p
pi 1(1  pi)  2 1(pi 1 + 1  pi)  2 1,
Cd  (n+ 1)(n  2)
2(n  1) : (D.6)
For an upper bound on Co, we again use pi < 1=2 for i < i
 and pi  1=2 for i  i.
Thus
Co =
1
n  1
nX
i=1
[pi 1(n  i+ 1) + i(1  pi)]
 1
n  1
"
iX
i=1
1
2
(n  i+ 1) +
nX
i=i
1
2
i
#
=
1
2(n  1)
"
5n2 + 6n+ 1
4
 

i   n+ 1
2
2#
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 (n+ 1)(5n+ 1)
8(n  1) ; (D.7)
which, together with (D.4) and (D.6), yields the upper bound in (4.9).
By (D.1) and (D.4), we have
PoS =
bC
C
 bmax
bmin

1 +
Cd
Co

:
Thus (4.10) follows from (D.3) and (D.6).
D.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3.2
Consider the case of homogeneous content creation rates with i = 1. Consider
a heterogeneous set of budgets of allocation where bi = b1 > b2, for all i 6= 2. The
optimal social cost, under centralized allocation, is given by
C =
Co
b1
+
1
b1

b1
b2
  1

1
n  1
"s
2

1  2
n

+
r
1  1
n
#2
;
where Co is as in (D.2). The social cost under selsh allocation is
bC = Co + Cd
b1
+
1
b1

b1
b2
  1

1
n  1
 
1p
n
+
r
1  2
n
!"p
n  1p
n

+ 2
r
1  2
n
#
;
where Cd is as in (D.5). By (D.3), (D.7) and (D.6), Co = (n) and Cd = O(n). If
b2=b1 = 
(n
2), then C = (b 12 n
 1) and bC = (b 12 n 1=2). Thus PoS = bC=C =
(
p
n), which grows unbounded with the network size.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3.3
Since b changes C and bC only by a multiplicative factor, it suces to prove the
theorem for b = 1. Let i be the hub of the i-th star, and Li the leaf nodes connected
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to it. Then nil = n 1 and nli = 1 for any l 2 Li. For adjacent hubs, ni 1;i = (i 1)p
and ni+1;i = (k   i)p. Then the optimal social cost is given by
C =
1
n(n  1)
 
kX
i=1
X
l2Li
(n  1) + S1
!
= 1  k
n
+
S1
n(n  1) ;
where
S1 =
kX
i=1
"X
l2Li
p
n  1 +
X
j=i1
q
(n  nji)nji
#2
:
Using the inequalities
P3
i=1 a
2
i 
 P3
i=1 ai
2  3P3i=1 a2i ; we obtain S1 = (S2),
where
S2 = k(p  1)2(n  1) +
kX
i=1
iX
j=i 1
p2j(k   j)
=(n  k)(p  1)(n  1) + 1
3
n(nk   p) = (n2maxfp; kg):
Thus C = (maxfp; kg) = 
(pn).
The cost under selsh allocation can be written as follows,
bC = 1
n(n  1)
 
kX
i=1
X
l2Li
(n  1) + S3
!
= 1  k
n
+
S2
n(n  1) ;
where
S3 =
kX
i=1
 X
l2Li
1 +
X
j=i1
p
nji
!"X
l2Li
(n  1) +
X
j=i1
(n  nji)pnji
#
:
Using the facts that jLij = p  1, nji  n and the inequality (n  x)
p
x  2
3
p
3
n3=2 for
x 2 [0; n], we obtain
S3 
kX
i=1
(p+ 2
p
n)

pn+
4
3
p
3
n3=2

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= O
 
(n+ k
p
n)(pn+ n3=2)

= O
 
n2maxfk; pg :
Thus bC = O(maxfp; kg). Since bC  C = (maxfp; kg), we have bC = (maxfp; kg)
and PoS = (1).
D.4 Proof of Theorem 4.3.4
As in the proof of Theorem 4.3.3, it suces to consider the case b = 1. Note that
ji = nji. The optimal social cost(4.8) and cost under selsh allocation (4.6) can now
be written as follows,
C =
1
n(n  1)
X
i2V
0@ X
j2N(i)
q
(n  nji)nji
1A2 ; (D.8)
and
bC = 1
n(n  1)
X
i2V
24 X
j2N(i)
(n  nji)pnji
350@ X
j2N(i)
p
nji
1A : (D.9)
Let the depth of the tree be h. Then n = k
h+1 1
k 1 . Label the nodes in such a way
that that for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, p(i) = d(i 1)=ke is the parent of i, cj(i) = k(i 1)+j+1
is the j-th child of i, for j = 1; 2; : : : ; k. Then np(i);i =
kh+1 kh h(i)+1
k 1 and ncj(i);i =
kh h(i) 1
k 1 , where h(i) = blogk(ki  i)c is the depth of node i.
By (D.8) , the optimal social cost is
C =
1
n(n  1)
nX
i=1
"q
(n  np(i);i)np(i);i +
kX
j=1
q
(n  ncj(i);i)ncj(i);i
#2
;
which is bounded by
1
n(n  1)(S1 + k
2S2)  C  2
n(n  1)(S1 + k
2S2);
where
S1 =
nX
i=1
(n  np(i);i)np(i);i;
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and
S2 =
nX
i=1
(n  nc1(i);i)nc1(i);i:
Using the facts that n = k
h+1 1
k 1 , np(i);i =
kh+1 kh h(i)+1
k 1 and nc1(i);i =
kh h(i) 1
k 1 , we
obtain
S1 =
1
(k   1)2
nX
i=1
(kh h(i)+1   1)(kh+1   kh h(i)+1)
=
1
(k   1)2
hX
h0=0
kh
0
(kh h
0+1   1)(kh+1   kh h0+1)
=
hk   h  2
(k   1)3 k
2h+2 +
hk   h+ 2k
(k   1)3 k
h+1
= (hk2h) = (n2 logk n);
and
S2 =
1
(k   1)2
nX
i=1
(kh+1   kh h(i))(kh h(i)   1)
=
1
(k   1)2
hX
h0=0
kh
0
(kh+1   kh h0)(kh h0   1) = 1
k
S1:
Therefore,
1 + k
n(n  1)S1  C
  2(1 + k)
n(n  1)S1;
and hence C = (k logk n).
By (D.9), the social cost under selsh allocation is
bC = 1
n(n  1)
nX
i=1

(n  np(i);i)pnp(i);i + k(n  nc1(i);i)pni;c1(i)
  p
np(i);i + 2
p
nc1(i);i

=
1
n(n  1)(S1 + k
2S2 + kS3);
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where
S3 =
nX
i=1
(2n  nc1(i);i   np(i);i)pnc1(i);inp(i);i:
Note that 2n  2n  nc1(i);i   np(i);i  n, and n  np(i);i  n=2 for i 6= 1, so
S3 = 
 
n3=2
nX
i=2
p
nc1(i);i
!
:
We also have
nX
i=2
p
nc1(i);i =
1p
k   1
h 1X
h0=1
kh
0p
kh h0   1 = (n=k);
yeilding S3 = (kn
2 logk n + n
5=2) and hence bC = (S3=n2) = (k logk n + pn).
Taking the ratio bC=C, the result follows.
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